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Abstract 
In the last few decades, researchers have identified many systematic errors – 
cognitive biases – in the human mind. The predominant notion of human beings 
as rational have gradually been flawed, in one context after another. In the last 
few years scholars have approached the question of what policy implications 
should be derived from these findings and what solutions there might be. Three 
main philosophic lines have been argued for: soft paternalism, coercive (hard) 
paternalism and skeptical libertarians. The theoretical framework of this paper is 
composed of case relevant cognitive biases together with suggested debiasing 
strategies. The main aim of this study is to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice. By analyzing mainly official documents in three cases – the UK, the US 
and the EU – of in-practice use of, both a case specific and an aggregated picture 
are presented. Questions of why and how government administrations have chosen 
to work with behavioral insights are in focus. The results show that a soft 
paternalist approach is the preferred strategy, but more coercive elements are 
also used. The identified ways to tackle cognitive biases in practice can be 
concluded in the use of default options, simplification and smart disclosure. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In many parts of the world governments are struggling to make ends meet in their 
national budgets. This is no less the case since the economical crisis hit the world 
around 2008. At the same time populations grow and more funding is required for 
areas such as healthcare and education to maintain the same level of health and 
cultivation in the welfare states. The populations of the western world are also 
getting older while the healthy life-years1 are not increasing in the same rate. 
Chronic diseases like diabetes is another major challenge. All this puts strong 
pressure on the welfare systems and national budgets around the western world. 
These times of demographic challenges and austerity, or even retrenchment, calls 
for considerations regarding new or complementary approaches to be used in 
policymaking. The main issue when searching for such approaches is that they 
will, preferably, have to be cheap. National budgets are tightened and finding 
political agreements on extensive reallocations of economical resources are often 
limited. So how may governments improve policy and welfare programs without 
having to increase budget items? 
After what have been described as the worst economical crisis since the late 
twenties, prevailing economic theory have been questioned. In the light of societal 
challenges policymakers and public administrations are searching for viable and 
efficient policy options. It comes across as no coincidence that the interest in 
applying behavioral insights to policymaking seem to have started for real during 
the crisis years (around 2008). Even though findings, about the irrationality in 
civic decision-making, have been around for a while, the best-selling book Nudge 
– Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness by behavioral 
economist Richard Thaler and law scholar Cass Sunstein, first released in 20082, 
was regarded by many as the first basic manual on how to apply behavioral 
insights3 to policy (e.g. Kahneman 2011: 372). The book seems to have been 
published at a very fortunate time.  
 The question and promise the advocators of these behavioral approaches put 
forward is:  How can what we today know, about human behavior, help us 
streamline our current and coming policies by dodging counterproductive 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 The number of years up to where people consider themselves being mainly unhealthy. 
2 This paper will here on refer to the second (2009) edition of this work. 
3 As explained further in 2.2 behavioral insights draw on cognitive biases in human decision-making. 
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elements and make policy programs and regulations more efficient and possible 
increase citizens wellbeing?  
In the last few decades behavioral research have found many – sometimes 
crucial – flaws in the way individuals make decisions and choices. The 
identification of such biases took off in the 1970s with some of the most cited 
articles in social science even today, written by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky (e.g. 1974, 1981, 1984). While the work on cognitive biases have been 
going on for some time, the ideas on how to ‘debias’ these biases, and also how to 
gain political understanding and influence for the debiasing methods, have 
lingered a bit more.  
It is highly important that the different aspects of cognitive biases and their 
implications are extensively examined. The inherent potential to influence civic 
behavior is strong and therefore it deserves to be scrutinized if, where and how it 
can be a valid and efficient foundation for policymaking. If proven to be a shady 
silver-bullet, like some critics would argue, the knowledge still has value and can 
help policymakers turn to other policy tools. Collecting knowledge like this 
requires multidisciplinary research on the subject, all the way from natural 
sciences to behavioral, social, political science and philosophy; from basic 
knowledge about human behavior to knowledge about how such behavior may 
affect and be adjusted into political and administrative systems.  
One potential solution to these biases, suggested by Thaler & Sunstein (2009), 
is the use of ‘nudges’. A nudge is a soft paternalistic policy-intervention where 
freedom of choice is maintained and economic incentives are not significantly 
changed. By using small means and creating small changes in the social 
environment, policymakers may be able to adapt to the cognitive flaws and 
change civic behavior by inducing citizens to make better choices for themselves, 
choices that – at the same time – have the potential to lower the expenses of the 
national budget. Nudges can be used both on smaller and more comprehensive 
policy issues. A small nudge could be to put vegetables at eye level in the school 
canteen while a more comprehensive nudge could be to switch the default setting 
to “opt-in” in a national organ donation program.  
There are however those who insist that the behavioral findings on cognitive 
biases require even more drastic measures. Sarah Conly (2013) argues that while 
nudging can help many to make better choices, many other individuals will still be 
making the same inferior choices and suffer from the outcomes. Therefore Conly 
demands a higher degree of coercive paternalism to conquer the biases.  
Whichever solution gets picked, the main idea is that policymakers should 
base their policymaking, not on the predominant rational assumptions derived 
from neoclassic economics, but on the behavioral insights derived from how 
people actually make decisions. 
In this paper we will look into how different administrations – the UK, the US 
and the EU – have worked with theories and strategies on cognitive biases, by 
applying behavioral insights to their policymaking. Behavioral findings are 
presented alongside philosophical approaches on paternalism and together this 
forms the theory of this paper. Finally the cases are being analyzed in the light of 
this theory. The main angles, from which the cases will be dealt with are: i) the 
  3 
why-question; the reasons, justifications and legitimization for using these 
approaches, and ii) the how-question; how have the cases been working with these 
approaches, what strategies have been used and which biases have been 
specifically targeted. 
1.2 Purpose 
Much has been written about cognitive biases, some have been written about the 
use of these biases in policymaking regarding civic decisions.4 However, none so 
far seem to have put this in a wider perspective where different theories meet in-
practice use in multiple countries. Therefore, the purpose of this paper have been 
to connect, relate and analyze: 
 
1) Cognitive biases  
2) Theories on paternalism, and  
3) In-practice work by the most influential cases. 
 
To do this it is necessary to: 
 
1) Map the cases where behavioral theories on cognitive biases have been 
applied as regulatory tools in policymaking.  
2) Find relevant theoretical explanations – to the use and justifications of 
these behavioral approaches – both by presenting the scientifically based 
theory and different philosophical approaches to policy interventions. 
 
This paper is not an impact assessment of the conducted policies and regulations 
in the included cases; rather the focus is on the ideas and strategies used in the 
respective case and how these relate to the wider theoretical behavioral 
approaches. It has not been the intention to establish any causal explanations in 
this paper, however, the targeted biases and ways to intervene them does tell us 
something about what strategies tend to be used more than others or are easier to 
gain understanding for among policymakers. 
1.3 Research question 
Main research question: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 Much of the previous research on these areas will be presented in the theory chapters (2 and 3). 
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What ideas and strategies, based on the knowledge on cognitive biases, have been 
applied, in practice, by government administrations in their policymaking? 
 
The main question is answered by breaking it down into two parts: 
 
1) Why do administrations choose to apply behavioral approaches into 
policymaking? 
2) How have the administrations been working with behavioral theory as a 
policy tool? 
 
Question 1, the why-question is about justification. Why have administrations 
chosen to work with these approaches and at this time.  
 
Question 2, the how-question, is dealing with in what ways the different cases 
have chosen to work with behavioral theories on cognitive biases. Which biases 
have been in focus and what approaches to libertarianism/paternalism have been 
considered and used? Have the cases applied mainly theoretical or empirical 
approaches? The question also connects to legitimacy issues, especially when 
dealing with more or less paternalistic interventions. 
1.4 Disposition/outline of thesis 
In chapter 2 the cognitive biases5 are presented. Initially the rationality 
assumptions will be discussed before moving over to the specific biases, or the 
‘bumps in rationality’, that will act as the analytical seeds for this paper. Chapter 2 
also deals with some theoretical implications or consequences these biases may 
have to citizens and policymakers.  
In chapter 3 the possible philosophical – or even ideological – ways to react 
to the biases are presented by discussing three overall approaches: libertarianism, 
soft paternalism and hard paternalism. 
Chapter 4 will tell readers about the methodological considerations that have 
been used when shaping this paper. The method used is shortly described as 
qualitative case studies based on analysis of documents. 
In chapter 5 we will look at the cases. Focus will be on why the 
administrations have chosen to use behavioral theory in policymaking and how 
they have been conducting the work, mainly focusing on the biases and the kind 
of interventions used to correct biases (debias). 
While most of the analysis is presented in each case, chapter 6 is a concluding 
analysis where some comparisons between cases and overall tendencies are made.  
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Finally chapter 7 presents further discussion points of aspects that are 
noteworthy but does not fully fall under the outline of this paper. 
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2 The bumps in rationality 
It’s hard to give up the idea of ourselves as completely rational. We feel as if 
we lose some dignity. But that’s the way it is, and there’s no dignity in 
clinging to an illusion.  
Sara Conly 2013b 
2.1 The rational agent 
The old commonsensical understanding in economics and other sciences that 
human beings make rational decisions has become more and more nuanced in the 
last few decades. Criticizing over-beliefs in the assumptions within rational choice 
theory sometimes even feels like bashing-in open doors. Advocators turn the blind 
eye while the opponents keep on preaching to the choir.  However, while the 
assumption of unbounded rationality can be feasible when making 
approximations of reality in well-confined cases (e.g. Ostrom 2007: 31), it might 
suffer from a lack of validity when dealing with more complex individual 
decisions and fails to explain why individuals tend to, sometimes, make inferior 
decisions about their own lives. The last statement is especially true if those 
inferior choices are not random, or due to lack of information, but due to 
systematic biases within the human behavior. 
Very simplified, the assumptions used in rational choice or rational agent 
theory are that: Individuals act as if they weigh costs versus benefits in order to 
maximize their utility within a certain delimited context. It is also assumed that 
individuals have a clear order of priority for given alternatives and that they have 
a well defined goal. Yet another highly important assumption of rationality is that 
individuals actually behave in ways consistent with their preferences. This is the 
most relevant part of the rationality assumption in the light of this paper. The 
biases presented in 2.2 show us that preferences and behavior are not necessarily 
consistent. 
 The obvious advantage of the assumptions in rational agent theories is that 
researchers can explain actions made by actors (citizens, policymakers, consumers 
etc.) with only very little information at hand. Given a certain turnout of an action, 
rational choice theory can help back track the turn of events and describe the 
reasoning of the involved actors, using the logic of the assumptions (e.g. Allison 
& Zelikow 1999: ch. 1). An objection to this is that such an instrumental view of 
people’s behavior might be too commonsensical and misses the crucial point on 
how people really behave. In modern decision theory models are still often 
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constructed with the rational actor as the ideal type (Tversky & Kahneman 
1974:1130). 
Thaler & Sunstein (2009: ch. 1) differs between the rational individual, Econ 
and the not so rational individual, Human. Both Econs and Humans can make 
decisions that lead to inferior results, but if Econs does so it is because they were 
lacking capacity or information to make a better decision at that given time. When 
Humans, on the other hand, make inferior decisions (which they do all the time) it 
is because the human mind and the human senses are prone to make systematic 
errors – biases – when dealing with certain issues. An Econ could never be 
systematically wrong. Humans are however teachable and fairly good at making 
decisions where the feedback is imminent and where they are allowed to re-decide 
in a near future. At the same time, Humans are not very good at making complex 
and rare decisions, such as picking an education or a retirement plan. 
In this paper some of the Human biases will be presented and implications to 
policymaking and potential solutions will be reflected upon. Before that, let us see 
if you, the reader, are an Econ or a Human by looking at the so-called Shepard’s 
table. Can you decide the proportions of these tables and tell which one is the 
longer? 
 
  
Now of course these two tables have the exact same proportions.6 The way our 
minds fool us when trying to make sense of the size and shape of these two tables 
is very similar to the way the cognitive biases affects Humans regarding some 
decisions. An Econ would not even understand the question since it sees the tables 
exactly a like (Thaler & Sunstein 2009: 17f.).  
2.2 Cognitive biases 
The broad notion ‘behavioral theory’ is commonly used in policy-related contexts 
when referring to something a bit narrower. ‘Behavioral theory’ does mean, both 
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in these policy contexts and in this paper, theory that is based on cognitive biases 
in human decision-making. This part of the paper will deal with the case relevant 
cognitive biases and potential implications to policymaking.  
There are many more biases than the ones presented here since the focus have 
been put on the biases that corresponds to the in-practice use of behavioral ideas 
in the cases presented in chapter 5. The biases presented below are in most cases 
the result of decades of research – for each and every bias – that, here, have been 
cut down to its main essence. Obviously such a cut will not do justice to all 
aspects and I would highly recommend reading the actual papers and books that 
these conclusions are based on. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the cognitive biases are not an information 
problem. Nor is it the result of intentional negligence by ‘some individuals’. The 
biases lead to inferior irrational choices that are unintentional systematical 
shortcomings of our minds. The theory will show how this can be considered by 
policymakers when designing policy, and how behaviorally informed policy-tools 
can work as an alternative, or complement to other policy tools, used when trying 
to change civic behavior. 
2.2.1 Dual-process theory – System 1 and System 2 
The division in System 1 and System 2 has many different names. Sometimes it is 
referred to as the automatic system and the reflective system, sometimes as fast 
and slow thinking (Kahneman 2011), the “doer” and the “planner” (Thaler & 
Sunstein 2009), or as the founders of “System 1 and 2”, Keith Stanovich and 
Richard West, nowadays prefer to call it: Type 1 and Type 2 processes (Stanovich 
& West 2000; Stanovich 2011: 19ff.). These different names on two types of 
cognitive ‘systems’ tell us a lot about what it is about. Research has found that 
humans are processing information and making choices and decisions in two 
different ways, one intuitive (System 1) and one reflective (System 2). The 
relation between System 1 and System 2 can sometimes function as a cognitive 
bias in itself, but also as a base for other identified biases. This division is 
commonly known as ‘dual-process theory’. 
System 1 – the fast, intuitive doer – is in general good at what it does, dealing 
with familiar situations and short-term predictions. Often it is important that we 
can make decisions rather swift and intuitive, however this is also what makes 
System 1 conflicted with systematic errors. System 1 makes us answer simpler 
questions than the actual question and has serious problems dealing with 
statistical and logical problems. The really serious twist; System 1 can never be 
turned of (Kahneman 2011: 25). Therefore, the intuitive reasoning will always 
interfere with your reflective processes. To demonstrate this, try to answer the 
simple problem below. Even if you probably manage to get it right, you will 
hopefully feel the conflict between the intuitive answer and the reflective. 
 
A bat and a ball cost 11 €. 
The bat costs 10 € more than the ball. 
  9 
How much does the ball cost?7 
 
System 2 on the other hand – the slow, reflective planner – is responsible for 
self-control and for taming the impulses of System 1. It is in System 2 we make 
computations that require attention and is therefore easily disrupted (by System 
1). While System 1 is always running, System 2 is lazy. When dealing with the 
theme of this paper it is of great importance that System 2 is “often associated 
with the subjective experience of agency, choice and concentration.” (Kahneman 
2011: ch. 1). 
No one is able to protect herself from System 1 and 2 biases by always 
keeping processes in System 2. That method would be way to slow and take up 
way too much mental strength. There is however the possibility that we can, to 
some extent, learn to recognize situations in which we are likely to make crucial 
systematic errors. One of the main premises presented by Kahneman (2011) is 
although that we are more likely to see other individuals’ errors than our own. 
This premise opens up an implicit way for different kinds of paternalistic or 
deliberative decision-making approaches, as we will discuss further in chapter 3. 
The baseball problem above also touches another related problem regarding 
intuitive decisions. While many possible solutions to cognitive biases may be 
fairly straightforward, and in line with our intuition, solutions to cognitive biases 
can sometimes be more sophisticated or even counter-intuitive. 
2.2.2 Thumb rule heuristics  
Being somewhat pioneers in the field of cognitive biases Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman (1974) presented some groundbreaking research. Tversky and 
Kahneman mapped out three heuristic principles that humans use when we create 
rules of thumb or judgments, on which we often base our decisions. These 
heuristics is in play for example when we make predictions or estimations of the 
probability or risk for certain events to occur. The biases that can be derived from 
these heuristics are very similar to when humans make estimations of size or 
distances (Tversky & Kahneman 1974: 1124), something similar to what we saw 
in the simple example with the Shepard’s table in 2.1. It should be pointed out that 
the heuristics presented here often works when creating rules of thumb, however 
they also have systematic shortcomings. Recently it has been found by scholars 
that the biases in these heuristics are the result of the interplay between System 1 
and System 2 (Thaler & Sunstein 2009: 23). 
One of the most important biases when discussing thumb rule heuristics is the 
availability bias. This bias is the flaw in peoples minds that when rare events 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 Did you get it right? Well obviously the answer is not that the ball costs 1 € and the bat costs 10 €. However, 
that is often the intuitive answer. The correct answer is given through the equation X+(X+10)=11 where “X” is 
representing the price of the ball. This gives us X=0.5, the ball costs 0.50 € and the bat 10.50 € making the bat 
cost 10 € more than the ball. 
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occur people are overestimating the risk/chance of such an event re-occurring. 
Common examples are major storms or Tsunamis (Tversky & Kahneman 1974: 
1127). 
Anchoring and adjusting is one of the most robust findings in experimental 
psychology. When thinking of a number before being faced with an estimation 
problem, people will mind that number even if it is completely unrelated to the 
problem (Kahneman 2011: 119ff.; Tversky & Kahneman 1974: 1128). Depending 
on what anchoring point we use, we will end up with different estimates. 
Other biased thumb rule heuristic: 
 
• Misconception of representativeness 
• Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes  
• Insensitivity to sample size 
• Misconceptions of chance 
• Insensitivity to predictability 
• The illusion of validity (too small samples) 
• Misconceptions of regression (regression to the mean) 
(Ibid.) 
Lessons learned: 
• The over belief in the reoccurrence of an event posses a risk for 
citizens if exploited by others 
• A more or less random starting point can have a major impact on what 
decisions we make 
2.2.3 Framing and loss aversion 
If you are a rational being, like the Econ, how a decision problem is framed 
should have no effect on your decision. Still research shows that how a problem is 
framed can have a significant effect on people’s decisions. The power of framing 
can be even stronger if it is connected to other biases, which seems to be 
especially true if connecting to the loss aversion bias8 (Tversky & Kahneman 
1991). Tversky & Kahneman (1981) showed that framing an experimental 
problem to respondents in different ways had different results. Even though the 
numbers are the same, the respondents seem to respond different depending on 
which reference point that was used when framing the issue. Is the problem 
framed as a gain or a loss in relation to the chosen reference point? If the relation 
to a reference point is expressed through “saving 200 out of 600 lives” (a gain), 
that alternative is more attractive than if the same option is framed as “400 out of 
600 will die for sure” (Ibid.). Other studies have given similar results when 
framing opportunities as financial incentives to individuals as gains versus losses. 
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When looking at framing and loss aversion from a policy perspective it should 
be seriously considered to, for example, create programs that take away parts of 
future gains rather than taking away current assets from individuals. 
 
Lessons: 
• People are loss averse 
• Mind the reference point and frame accordingly 
2.2.4 The status quo bias 
Unlike what is sometimes suggested by economic theory or rational choice 
theorists most decisions come with a status quo alternative. This alternative is i) to 
do nothing or ii) to maintain a current or previous decision. In 1988 William 
Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser found that the status quo alternative was 
disproportionally sticky when individuals even made important decisions 
regarding their lives such as picking health plans or retirement programs. They 
entitled this cognitive flaw: the status quo bias (1988:8).  
If policymakers, marketers or other actors see potential in exploiting this bias 
there is a powerful way to do so by designing well though out default options or 
by making a product become the default option in that specific market (Thaler & 
Sunstein 2009: 35). While private companies might sometimes use the default 
rational in a deceiving way, with regards to the cognitive biases, it should be 
noted that the worst defaults of that kind are most likely eliminated by the market 
competition itself (Sunstein 2013: 113). 
 To policymakers the status-quo bias could be intervened in four main ways: 
  
1) To use the power of a default option or a default rule to engage citizens in 
a policy program.  
2) To use coercive means to ban all alternatives but one or by making one 
option universal. 
3) To ‘counter nudge’ against nudges conducted by actors on the private 
market who might exploit the status quo bias in citizens. 
4) To require individuals to make an active choice (Ibid.: 119).  
 
Lessons: 
• A no-action (passive) alternative is never a neutral option and has 
potential to change behavior if designed properly. 
2.2.5 Social conformity biases 
It should not come as news to anyone that we, humans, are social creatures that 
profoundly live our lives in the light of identities, group belonging, norms and 
institutions. While ‘being social’ in most cases is considered a great thing – 
meaning that the individual has adapted and submitted herself, in the expected 
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way, to the social environment – there are also downsides to social behavior. 
Terrible examples such as the Nazi- regime or the mass suicides of sects like the 
People’s Temple are telling examples of the inherent potential in social 
conformity. We do not have to draw on extremes like that to make a case for 
cognitive biases of social desirability however. Thaler & Sunstein divides the 
social biases into two categories: social information biases and peer pressure 
(2009: 54).  
The information bias is related to the effect that people tend to use the action 
of others to establish how they ought to think or act, even if this means doing the 
most horrible or irrational things. When people, in experiments, are asked to 
decide on their own without seeing the results of others they are rarely failing on 
very simple tasks. However, if individuals are first presented with the answers of 
others they are failing to a much higher extent (e.g. Asch 1955). In a more recent 
study in Japan it was found that individuals were seven times more likely to chose 
an socially unacceptable option if presented with the information that the majority 
of the preceding respondents picked that option (Kondo et al. 2010). Note that 
both these findings were found by eliminating the element of peer pressure 
completely. There is even some evidence implying that when people say that they 
see things in the same way as others do in conformity experiments like this, 
analysis of their brains suggest they actually do see it that way (Berns et al. 2005). 
The peer pressure bias on the other hand is related to the implicit wrath of 
other people if you chose a path that is not endorsed by them. This is probably a 
more obvious way of looking at social conformity and is commonly seen in the 
forms of bullying, group pressure settings of different types and the way most 
people dress. 
 
Lessons: 
• We inform ourselves using the actions of others. Even if their action is 
sometimes really harmful 
• We are biased towards acting like others due to peer pressure. Even if 
their action is sometimes really harmful 
2.2.6 The scarcity-mindset an tunneling 
Most people would agree that things should be kept simple. Whether we are 
dealing with a ticket system for public transportation in a foreign town during a 
summer vacation or with an application to apply for a school or financial aid, 
simple is in general a good thing for the individual faced with a task. While the 
pros of keeping things simple might be obvious, behavioral research in the last 
few years have shed a new light on why reducing hassle and simplifying things 
can be of crucial importance, especially for underprivileged individuals. 
By conducting experiments and gathering experimental findings from real life 
situations Sendhil Mullainatan & Eldar Shafir (2013) have gouged out a 
theoretical approach based on cognitive biases that are in play when humans face 
scarcity. Scarcity in this theory mainly refers to the lack of money (or resources), 
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time or social connections, but also to other types of scarcity – like scarcity of 
calories when on a diet – are suggested to have similar effects. 
After having conducted experiments around the world Mullainatan & Shafir 
show that individuals, whether it is sugar cane farmers in India or mall visitors in 
the US, are getting their mental “bandwidth” significantly “taxed” when facing 
scarcity. This forces them into a constant and mentally challenging economic 
tradeoff reasoning. The mental bandwidth are defined and operationalized by 
looking at two factors: cognitive capacity and executive control. Cognitive 
capacity is measured using standardized IQ tests before and after scarcity 
interventions, while executive control is measured using simple two-button tests 
(right and left) examining the individual’s self-control and potential to withstand 
immediate reactions when the reactions are wrong. Results show that, due to the 
scarcity effect, executive control and IQ levels are seriously reduced. The IQ is 
taxed by 13-14 points on the standardized IQ scale.9 13 points are enough to go 
from the category “average” to the category “borderline deficient” (Mullainatan & 
Shafir 2013: ch. 2, p. 52). This mechanism is in play, for example, before and 
after farmers gets paid for the year’s harvest. 
While scarcity also has advantages – it actually makes you better at the task 
connected to managing your scarcity (called the focus dividend) – it severely taxes 
your mental bandwidth. When focusing on the sole task of reducing scarcity you 
are also “tunneling” on that task and are leaving out other, more or less important 
tasks, in your life (Ibid: 29). If suffering from scarcity over a longer period of time 
the tunneling effect can trap individuals, facilitate inferior decisions about other 
parts of their life and possibly even lead to scarcity in other areas that will amplify 
the effects incrementally. As an example, a widow and mother of two, who is 
having a hard time managing to put food on the table each day, might tunnel even 
crucial things such as going for free vaccine for her children. The lack of 
vaccination is then likely to lead to other issues for the family and the mental 
bandwidth is taxed even more. While snowball effect stories like this one are 
really unfortunate there are some ideas and means on how to counteract the 
scarcity traps and negative effects of tunneling. 
Some would argue that findings like the ones presented by Mullainatan & 
Shafir (2013) calls for a total restructuring of our modern societies into more 
equal arrangements.10 In this paper we will not go in depth on macro solutions 
like that, but look more into micro level solutions that have shown to have a real 
impact. Two main solutions will be in focus here: incentives and simplification.   
Well-designed incentives are incentives that – although the real policy issue is 
outside of the tunnel for the targeted individuals – are immediate and inside of the 
mental tunnel. The incentive does not have to be very large. For example, when 
facing the policy issue of having too many children unvaccinated in rural India, 
researchers found that just a kilogram of lentils proved to be an efficient incentive 
that made parents vaccinate their children (Banerjee et al. 2010; Mullainatan & 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
9 The mean value being 100 and standard deviation 15. 
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Shafir 2013: 173). When carrying out aid to the third world, free is not always 
going to be enough. If the advantages, of for example immunization of children, 
lay to far ahead in time, a visit to a medical facility is likely to be tunneled out or 
put aside for more immediate threats. The inconsistency when making tradeoffs, 
between costs and benefits, that occur in different places in time is a general flaw 
in the human mind and not limited to underprivileged individuals in the third 
world (Cappelen et al. 2010: 356). The same phenomenon can be spotted in the 
developed world when people are not saving enough for retirement or do not look 
after their medical conditions properly. 
The second solution, simplification, does, as was pointed out initially in this 
part, come across as very sound and immediate. But if we can be sure of why we 
are in fact making choice-environments simpler for individuals we may also be 
able to make simplified redesigns more efficient. When trying to solve policy 
issues that involve individuals trapped in scarcity mindsets, simplification can be 
especially important. Very simply put, simplification (ceteris paribus) is a way to 
keep the mental bandwidth tax to a minimum and reduces the risk of important 
tasks being neglected due to procrastination, myopia or tunneling. One area with 
large potential for simplification is application processes and the filling out of 
forms. A study in the US showed that simplifying the application process for 
financial aid, to different degrees, had a major impact on whether or not low-
income high school graduates enroll in college. When receiving personal help for 
filling out the forms, enrollment to college increased by 29 percent (Haycock 
2006). Another experimental study showed that students from families without 
college experience tripled their enrollment rate if receiving help in filling out the 
applications (Bettinger et al. 2012). While simplifications most likely affect us all 
positively, it seems to be especially positive for people that are worse off. 
A factor to keep in mind, when dealing with scarcity mindsets, is that the 
timing of a policy intervention can have a big impact on the turnout. This is even 
more important if the policy action aims at teaching or informing since that 
requires at least some mental bandwidth to have any impact. Approaching farmers 
after rather that before harvest or approaching the poor after rather than before 
Christmas would most likely be preferable and increase the positive impact of the 
intervention (Mullainatan & Shafir 2013: 219).  
 
Lessons: 
• Aiming incentives towards the inside the mental tunnel 
• Simplification of procedures is especially helpful to people who are 
worse off in society 
• Timing of policy interventions should be strategically picked 
2.3 Finding policy-relevant bumps 
The cognitive flaws, or bumps in rationality, that have been presented above do 
however not tell us anything about how individuals will act regarding a specific 
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new policy or regulation. To reach a point were it is possible to speak about policy 
informed by how people actually make decisions it is necessary to first theorize 
and then analyze. Based on the research findings concerning cognitive flaws a 
researcher or analyst can build a hypothesis that is possible to test in a real 
situation. These tests are usually conducted in the form of experiments like 
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs). Using RCTs, however, require a very 
thought out structure of the organization that are assigned to work with behavioral 
insights. Therefore there will be two kinds of behaviorally based insights. The 
theory based policy and the empirically based policy. The theory-based version 
borrows scientific findings from other similar contexts and uses it to try and 
change behavior in closely related contexts. The empirically based version uses 
theory from another context to create a hypothesis and then tests this hypothesis, 
using RCTs, on the policy intervention in question. Then there are obviously 
degrees of how theoretical or how empirical a certain policy foundation is. An 
even more thorough empirical approach would re-test and if necessary re-shape 
the hypothesis. 
When dealing with human beings as the object of study there are always 
problems involved due to learning. The physicist does not very often face the 
dilemma of an atom having learned something new since the last time, but for a 
social scientist it happens all the time. People learn, change their minds and their 
intentions might not be very constant over time. To deal with this issue in 
behavioral tests such as RCTs it is probably sound to treat the test results like 
perishables and to be adaptive in the policymaking. 
2.4 Relevance for governments 
Why then is it necessary for governments to take cognitive biases into 
consideration? The answer is two fold. First, if building policy solely on the 
rational foundation that tells us citizens are rational, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of such policies will not be optimized. This will lead to citizens that are 
worse off than they needed to be and to governments wasting efforts without 
getting satisfying results. Secondly, because it should be a basic right to be able to 
make decisions in a sound and enabling environment. Or put in a different way; 
how would it be justified to leave citizens in a suboptimal state if the tools to 
increase their wellbeing were at hand and were cheap to use? 
Why then have we, humans, come this far in terms of economic development, 
democratization, freedom of speech, health and wellbeing, child mortality rates, 
increasing life spans and so on, despite our biased minds and our unawareness of 
it up until recently? As mentioned in the introduction, the ‘2008 crisis’ were the 
hardest blow to western economic development since the late 1930s. In this 80 
years most of the western world, especially after the Second World War, were 
having golden ages where economic development in terms in GDP where sky 
rocketing. This was not really a time where western citizens and governments had 
to be very efficient to make ends meet. Today an economic golden age probably 
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seems distant to most people and to maintain our levels of wellbeing we will have 
to be a bit more efficient and innovative in our economic trade-offs. 
 A final argument is that the research on cognitive biases and related areas has 
shown strong evidence, in the last few decades, on how our minds really work. 
This knowledge have not been available before that and therefore many traditional 
ways of reasoning, such as the free, autonomous and rational choice and the ways 
governments traditionally have been governing, could be seen as lacking a bit 
behind the reality that modern research depicts. 
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3 Debiasing philosophies 
The cognitive flaws in human decision-making, such as those presented in chapter 
2 are widely accepted within many fields of science, especially psychology and 
behavioral economics. The bumps in rationality are thus not the main issue. The 
controversy is rather about if and how our societies should respond to those flaws. 
This chapter presents different philosophical approaches to the cognitive flaws; 
different debiasing strategies. It also discusses the theoretical relation to the 
biases. The main focus is on the degrees of paternalism, stretching from 
libertarianism – almost no paternalism – to coercive paternalism. 
The following philosophical fundaments (3.1- 3.4) are used as ideal types 
when discussing and analyzing different levels of regulation. It stands for itself 
that in all the current systems of regulation in the world (nation states being the 
most prominent one), there are mixes of those three fundaments. The extent to 
which, one or the other, is used might however differ a lot.  
3.1 Libertarianism 
Libertarianism might not be a philosophical foundation to any solution to the 
cognitive bias problem; rather it is the status quo from which regulation is trying 
to move citizens. Nevertheless, it is an important starting point for discussions on 
different approaches to paternalism.  
The basic principles of the libertarian approach are two: First, the individual is 
rational enough to make her own decisions; and secondly, if the individual fails in 
her decisions, there is no miracle machine in the government that gives the 
policymakers a lesser fail-rate while taking the decisions on behalf of the 
individual. 
The base of libertarian thoughts about the state and the state’s relation to 
citizens goes back to the Age of Enlightenment and thinkers like John Locke, and 
later, John Stuart Mill – perhaps the most well-known opponent against 
paternalism. The Enlightenment is sometimes called the Age of Reason, which 
indicates the importance and strong beliefs in the power of a deliberative 
individual mind. An important idea drawn from this time, expressed some 100 
years later, by Mill in On Liberty (2001 [1859]), which opposes paternalistic 
thought, is that it can never be justified to protect an individual against herself. It 
can only be justifiable to intervene when an individual is bringing harm to others. 
Commonly known as the “harm principle”. To be fair, Mill admits that it can be 
justified to stop an individual from crossing a broken bridge unknowingly. This 
however, raises a demarcation problem of when paternalistic intervention to 
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protect the individual from herself is justified, and when it is not. If accepting that 
the person walking on the bridge is not suicidal, this is presumably an information 
problem. The person walking on the bridge does not see the crack that the person 
below does, and because of the lack of information the person on the bridge is 
unknowingly in danger. While there is most likely no universal solution to these 
kinds of information problems, there are ideas on how societies can best disperse 
information and knowledge. Education is one example. Another example on how 
to disperse information regarding more economical issues is, as Fredrich von 
Hayek (1945) suggested, the price mechanism. Hayek was a true believer in the 
potential of market competition to solve societal issues. To put his ideas in the 
light of cognitive biases we turn to the dispersion of knowledge and information 
in society. What makes the market, or more specifically the price mechanism, a 
better solution than a solution created by a few decision makers? Knowledge and 
information are widely spread among individuals of our societies. Therefore a few 
experts will always have less knowledge than the society as a whole. The solution 
to this problem, according to Hayek, is not to have politicians or government 
planners make decisions based on a few expert opinions, but to let the market 
mechanism act as a collector of societal knowledge. The quality of a product is 
reflected in its prize in relation to other products and so on (Hayek 1945). Others, 
who mainly agree with Hayek, have argued that Hayek had a point but that the 
tables have turned since the early-mid 1900s and that the information technologies 
of today present us with better alternatives to solve the issue of dispersing 
information in society (Sunstein 2013: 80). 
The biases presented in chapter 2 stands uncorrected however, and there might 
be a good explanation for this in the light of market mechanisms. One very strong 
reason that market mechanisms will not always work towards, but sometimes 
rather against, a solution to the bias problem has to do with market incentives, 
often using marketing as a main tool. It is not news to anyone who has studied 
psychology or related subjects that cognitive biases have been used to convince 
people, often successfully, for a long time in advertising. While stating that the 
market competition often do a lot of good, Thaler & Sunstein highlights that in 
some cases market actors have strong incentives to exploit the flaws of individual 
decision-heuristics. Insurances are pointed out as an especially treacherous area 
(2009: 74, 78ff.). After a flood, that rarely occurs, for example, insurance 
companies are likely to – in an efficient way – take advantage of the availability 
heuristic (2.2.2) since people will heavily overestimate the risk of a new flood. 
The advantage can be taken both in advertising and overpricing of insurances. 
Market mechanisms also have some ways of getting rid of situations where 
consumers could have been exploited through their biases, like driving companies, 
with more extreme examples of such exploitations, out of business (Sunstein 
2013: 113). At the same time, exploiting the bias to a lesser extent, as in the flood 
example, remains a risk for suboptimal outcomes for our societies. Or for Hayek’s 
price mechanism which will be infected with these biases as well.  
The biases presented in chapter 2, and many more like them, are in play even 
if individuals are informed or educated. There is of course the idea that people 
should be educated in how cognitive biases work so that they might be able to 
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recognize situations where their minds might be fooling them. This would 
probably be a smart thing to do, but just as we are blind for our biases, we are also 
blind for our blindness of the biases, especially regarding our own biases (Pronin 
et al.2002; Kahneman 2011). This makes it, in some cases, harder for you to 
determine which action is the best action for you. The thought can obviously be 
hard to accept since many of us are prone to believe (blindly) in our own senses, 
heuristics and judgments (Pronin et al. 2002). This overestimation of our own 
capacities is of course nothing but the result a cognitive bias in itself. 
While educating and informing are evidently important tools in our societies, 
for a number of reasons, they only work all the way on rational agents such as 
Econs. For the rest of us, Humans, education is of great importance as well, but 
the cognitive biases will often leave us with what Sendhil Mullainatan calls “the 
last mile problem” (Idea42 2012). We know what we prefer and we believe we 
know how to act on what we prefer, but we do not act. And sometimes we do act, 
but the action is not consistent with our preferences. If we do not act or act in 
ways that are inconsistent with our preferences, we might just need a nudge in the 
right direction? Different kinds of paternalistic interventions might offer such 
help. 
3.2 Soft Paternalism 
Soft paternalism is probably the version of paternalism that has gained most new 
ground in the last decades. Often considered a middle way, soft paternalism 
comes in a few different forms. In philosophical terms ‘soft paternalism’ is 
usually thought of in the way Joel Feinberg expressed it in his work Harm to Self 
(1986). Feinberg uses soft paternalism for paternalism exercised towards an 
individual whose choice is insufficiently voluntary to be her own. Hard 
paternalism, on the other hand, is paternalism exercised towards sufficiently 
voluntary choices. In less philosophical ways soft paternalism is usually used as a 
notion for paternalism that is not coercive and that does not close any paths of 
action for an individual. The type of soft paternalism used for discussion here will 
mainly be this one. In 2003 Camerer et al. used a similar definition for what they 
called “Asymmetric Paternalism” in their article Regulation for conservatives: 
Behavioral economics and the case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’. The same year 
Thaler & Sunstein released their first take on soft paternalism under the name: 
Libertarian Paternalism (2003). Thaler & Sunstein later elaborated their ideas on 
libertarian paternalism further in their bestselling book Nudge – Improving 
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness in 200811 where they also 
established the notion “nudge” as a verb for applying libertarian paternalism to 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11 First released in 2008. However the version referred to later on in this paper is copyrighted in 2009. 
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policymaking. More skeptic scholars, like Whitman & Rizzo (2007) use the 
straightforward name “New paternalism” to categorize these middle ground ideas.  
Applying libertarian paternalism by the use of nudges follow two main 
characteristics. A nudge is a change in the social environment that is:  
 
1. Non coercive and choice preserving. The choices are still the same and no 
alternatives are taken off the table 
2. No severe shift in economic incentives for individuals or market actors 
 
The most important difference between hard paternalism and soft paternalism is 
that the latter one does not refuse the individual any choices or alternatives, it is 
choice preserving. Possible choices to choose from are always the result of a 
choice architect. The choice architecture might be either intentional or 
unintentional, but no architecture is neutral (Thaler & Sunstein 2009: 83ff.).  
There has been some debate regarding if a nudge has to be intentional or not to 
be considered a nudge (for an overview see Hansen & Jespersen 2013), mainly 
from critics of nudging. Much of the criticism rests on the argument that 
intentional nudges are not neutral while “accidental” nudges are. This would, one 
might suspect, be followed by the definitions of intentional and accidental; which 
is not the case. Instead, accidental and intentional choice-environments tend to be 
separated only by the complexness of its structures. When a structure is too 
complex it is categorized as “accidental” and thus neutral. A second flaw in this 
line of criticism is the difference between government action and inaction. We all 
agree that pushing someone off a cliff is wrong and therefore this type of action is 
reflected in our laws and enforced by coercive paternalist means. But what if we 
are just watching someone slip down from a cliff to a certain death when we could 
easily have saved that someone? Having insights and tools for the redress of the 
cognitive biases, but not using them, has to be considered a non-neutral choice by 
governments. At least when dealing with inferior choices that will lead to major 
health threats or life threatening situations for citizens. Even if we might not want 
to punish people who chose the path of inaction, by law, it could hardly be 
considered wrong to save a person from falling off a cliff.  
What should be added to this is as Cass Sunstein pointes out; a nudge can be 
both a paternalistic and a non-paternalistic intervention. A nudge is paternalistic if 
it tries to protect choosers from themselves, but a nudge is non-paternalistic if it 
tries to prevent harm to others (Sunstein 2013: 192). It is very likely that also John 
Stuart Mill would agree on this dual role of the nudge concept.  
Information and education can act as simple and powerful nudges, although it 
is usually more a question of how things are informed of or educated that is of 
interest for a soft paternalist. The strategic way in which the information is 
presented is usually of great importance as well. Strategic use of bias-related 
factors such as framing, tunneling, timing and social conformity will have an 
impact when designing information campaigns. This becomes evident when 
regarding, for example, the difference between general information about the 
dangers of smoking and putting (scary) visual information on cigarette packs. 
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Another critic against soft paternalistic approaches like nudging is that they 
might work a couple of times until people get the ‘hang of it’ and might change 
their behavior. The counter argument to this critic is that these interventions 
requires adaptive governments where the soft policy interventions have to be 
tested and retested, preferably through experiments, to maintain their reliability 
and efficiency.  
 A more sophisticated nudge could be to draw lines just before sharp turns on 
roads creating the illusion that the car is moving faster than it is, which makes the 
drivers slow down. A simpler but often powerful nudge is to make use of the 
status quo bias and put in serious efforts to design smart default options. To 
investigate the power of default options and framing Johnson & Goldstein (2003) 
looked at the rate in which people donate their organs in different European 
countries. Similar countries – like Sweden (86%) and Denmark (4%); Austria 
(100%) and Germany (12%) – differed severely in donation rates. All this because 
of how the question, when asked to donate, was framed and whether the default 
alternative was to donate or not donate. 
Cost-benefit analyses is sometimes brought up as a nudge that can act, both as 
a safeguard from rash intuitive decisions, and as a spurring nudge, to make 
choices or engage in policy matters that at first glance may look (intuitively) 
unattractive (Sunstein 2013: 152f.). The idea of using cost-benefit analysis as a 
nudge rests on the potential it has to force individuals or institutional bodies to 
make decisions in System 2 rather than System 1 – to use self-control instead of 
emotions when making complex decisions. As we will see when turning to the 
cases in chapter 2, there are many more examples of countering biases in a soft 
paternalistic fashion.  
If the American federal gun law, stated in the famous second amendment, is a 
safeguard against misuse and oppression after having concentrated and delegated 
power, then libertarian paternalism is presented as a way to change civic behavior 
while maintaining a safeguard against meddlesome governments. Meddlesome 
policymakers might, in the eyes of libertarians, start to ban certain actions.  
3.3 Hard Paternalism 
Banning cigarettes, by law, constitutes a textbook example of hard or coercive 
paternalism, where the choices or actions are simply taken off the table and 
violations are being enforced, outmost, by threat of violence. 
There are two obvious reasons for using coercive or law-enforced paternalism. 
The first one is the main rational behind the cigarettes example, to protect citizens 
from themselves and their inferior choices. The other rational that may justify the 
use of coercive paternalism is the one used when regulating prostitution in many 
countries. Due to certain structural imbalances of power between certain social 
groups of individuals the government has decided to protect the exposed 
individuals both from themselves and from such power structures. Another 
example of the structure-protection rational is the issue of second hand smoke. If a 
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child is brought up by two heavy smoking parents it will be exposed to serious 
health issues without ever having a choice.  
There might also be a third alternative used when justifying coercive 
paternalism. Returning to the cigarette example, it might be possible to justify a 
ban on cigarettes due to increasing health costs that could jeopardize the popular 
support and economic base for national welfare programs.12 Let us call this third 
version paternalistic welfare-protection. In this paper paternalistic interventions 
will, however, mostly relate to the poor-choice protection. 
In her work Against Autonomy – Justifying Coercive Paternalism (2013) 
Sarah Conly takes a stand for coercive paternalism drawing on behavioral 
research on cognitive biases. Conly states that anti paternalists like Mill never 
were aware of such biases and therefore Mill’s take on the ‘harm principle’ is 
outdated and it is likely that even Mill would revise his view of the justifications 
for paternalistic interventions. Conly argues that these scientific findings not only 
justify us to question the free and rational choice, but to act on them in a coercive 
way. The main objection from Conly against a softer paternalism such as Thaler 
& Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism (2009) is that, while maintaining every 
option for citizens and making citizens – in general – better of, it will still leave a 
bunch of individuals – who have made poor decisions – in a bad situation. For 
example, even if nudging people towards healthier food, there will still be some 
that will stick with the unhealthy food if such food is still an option. The coercive 
paternalist approach Conly represents does not want to sacrifice the well being of 
a few to maintain the liberty of the many (Conly 2013: 31).  
The obvious comment on this criticism by Conly is that coercive paternalism 
cannot really take away any options at all, that would require total supervision and 
safeguarding (resting on the threat of violence) of each and every citizen around-
the-clock. Since this is not even remotely realistic, or what Conly argues for, 
options to citizens will remain in a coercive paternalist approach, but they will 
remain with higher or different costs. Punishments and the likely development of 
black-market alternatives will be a major issue to deal with for the coercive 
paternalist. If not dealt with efficiently enough, it will undermine the whole 
argument behind the justification of coercive paternalism over soft paternalism 
(Conly 2013: ch. 5). 
In most western societies today there are some deeply rooted applications of 
coercive paternalism. Two examples being prescription medicine and parents right 
to decide for their children (or for the state to decide over both parents and 
children if parents fail in their care). This brings up the question on whether 
certain areas are deemed more or less suitable or justifiable for coercive 
paternalist interventions. While this is indeed a normative question the examples 
make it clear that coercive interventions are widely accepted in some areas by 
most western populations. Part 3.4 deals a bit more with paternalism in relation to 
different types of choices. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
12 Note that the cigarette example here is a theoretical example; in reality the costs/benefits to society regarding 
smoking are disputed. 
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Another point that Conly has a hard time handling, and that Thaler & Sunstein 
(unrelated to Conly) comment on, is that hard regulation does not always change 
the intended behavior. Nudges may sometimes have a more efficient impact on 
civic behavior than coercive laws (Thaler & Sunstein 2009: 101). In Sweden for 
example, we have a law on wearing seat belts on both public and commercial 
buses when travelling on the freeway. In Conly’s coercive paternalist words, this 
means that there is no choice for the bus passengers; to wear seat belts have been 
decided for them. However, recent investigations show that as many as 7 out of 10 
passengers do not use seat belts on public buses, while travelling on the highway 
(SVT 2014). This indicates at least some form of choice. There might be a number 
of reasons for this, but the interesting thing for this paper is that this specific 
paternalistic regulation – whether or not it is morally right or wrong – seems to be 
terribly ineffective sometimes. Even though this is a fairly new law, in a case like 
this it is very likely that a soft paternalistic approach would be more efficient. For 
example, pictures of bus crashes on billboards with number of deaths and number 
of seat belt wearers along the freeway would probably have a bigger impact on 
passenger behavior than the law.  
Another alternative is to combine a coercive paternalist law with the soft 
paternalist billboards. It is of course possible to apply more efficient nudges for 
the seat belt scenario, but having a flashing light with a yelling sound on each seat 
felt to excessive even as an example. But then again, the extent of an intervention 
is always in relation to the risk of a certain behavior in a certain context. If 
someone failed to lower the bar on a roller coaster ride, the light-and-sound nudge 
would probably not be excessive.  
Who then should make the decisions for us? And what makes these 
individuals better suited for making those decisions than the individual herself? A 
common understanding on paternalistic interventions is that some kind of elite, 
experts or democratically elected politicians are going to tell us what to do and 
what not to do to a greater extent. While this if of course true to some extent – 
because those are the types of actors we generally turn to when dealing with 
potential collective concerns or decisions – it is not the important part of taking 
away certain decisions from individuals. The important part is that these decisions 
are decided by individuals who act in an environment that is – as far as possible – 
safeguarded for the cognitive biases. Conly argues that what we need when 
creating paternalistic constrains, is for people who are not currently in the 
automatic decision system [1] to create those constrains; in other words, we would 
prefer if the planner rather than the doer created the paternalistic constrains 
(Conly 2013: 38). 
3.4 Different types of choices 
Drawn from the biases, and necessary to take into consideration before looking at 
practical solutions, we can see that there are basically two types of choices 
citizens or policymakers can face while trying to govern civic behavior. The first 
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one is the aggregated choice, which means that the impact of an action – for 
example drinking poison – will have a negative impact on all individuals who 
chose that action. The second type of choice is the personalized choice. When 
facing the choice of designing your retirement plan, it is very likely that (even if 
we assume you make a rationally optimal choice) other individuals have other 
optimal choices due to diversity of situation, age and so on. The subjective 
opinion on what type of choice is an aggregated choice and what type is a 
personalized choice can however make this classification a bit blurry.  
The different types of choices are most likely to be of importance when 
looking at policy alternatives such as libertarian paternalism vs. coercive 
paternalism. Banning an aggregated choice, like drinking poison, is less likely to 
have as many adverse effects and opponents, as a ban on a personalized choice 
like carrying a firearm. 
If faced with an aggregated choice there is, at least, one more theoretical 
approach when dealing with the cognitive biases. Through deliberative means and 
decision-making by civic interest group, there is the possibility that crucial 
decisions, that are otherwise likely to be made in System 1, on an individual level, 
can be debiased by interpersonal reflection and slower decisions. This deliberative 
approach has been presented as the “Think Think”-approach and can sometimes 
be seen as an alternative to nudging or coercive paternalism (John et al. 2009). 
The firearm example touches on another problematic dimension of regulating 
or liberating citizen’s choices; the issue of negative externalities that comes with 
some individual choices. Since most of our current laws and justice systems are 
designed to enforce one individual’s choice from having negative spillover-effects 
on other individuals, this issue is to a wide extent already dealt with. And since 
even John Stuart Mill agreed, in the harm principle, that protecting others from 
this kind of adverse effects where fair game for paternalistic interventions, non of 
the three main approaches (3.1- 3.3) really oppose such cohesive actions. 
3.5 In-betweeners 
Looking into the conceptual world of different behavioral debiasing approaches it 
becomes clear that not all interventions can be defined as either soft paternalism 
or hard paternalism. There are in-betweeners. 
One common example of an in-betweener is regulating the sizes of cigarette 
packs or (as in New York13) soda cans, in an attempt to change civic behavior by 
drawing on the human bias that makes us eat and drink more if containers are 
larger (see e.g. Sunstein 2013: 40). While this can certainly have an effect on civic 
behavior it could also change economic incentives. Even if people can still buy 
their desired amount of the product, there is a possibility that regulations like this 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
13 The regulation was recently overruled, but the theoretical example holds (NBC 2014). 
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will alter the economic conditions for producers. Consequently, if this 
intervention does in fact change the economic incentives significantly, it 
disqualifies itself as a nudge, even though freedom of choice is maintained. An 
interesting point here is however, where to draw the line for changing economic 
incentives? If forcing market actors to redesign consumer contracts to be less 
confusing and prohibitive (to have people understand what they really buy), this 
would most likely inflict some damage on some market actors. But at the same 
time, most people would agree that state regulations are a profound necessity for 
any well functioning market. By establishing and enforcing market basics, such as 
contract code and property rights, it allows market actors to compete on similar 
terms. Laws on contract codes and property rights are obviously the result of 
profound coercive actions. It is in the zone of these question marks that the most 
interesting in-betweeners seem to be found. 
3.6 The role of behavioralists in policymaking 
To be able to create, at least some, economic slack in the stressed out budgets it is 
likely that policymakers will have to look for solutions outside of the box to apply 
behavioral insights to their policies. Bavel et al. (2013) suggests four “stages” to 
apply behavioral insights to policymaking: 
 
1) When designing policy drafts 
2) When implementing policy or making cost-benefit analysis or impact 
assessments 
3) To make small pilot studies that may lead the way, after having decided 
upon an option 
4) When critically evaluating existing policies 
 
While these possible stages for action should be considered, it might also be 
relevant to approach the phenomenon in a broader way. New ideas does not 
always have to be radical or very innovative in themselves to be good, sometimes 
approaching issues from a different angle might do the trick, or from all angles at 
the same time. During the 2006 Finnish presidency of the European Union, the 
Health in All Policies (HiAP) was introduced to the EU policymaking (Health 
Inequalities Portal). The idea is simple and takes a ‘wide stance’ on health. 
Healthcare is a tough challenge and a huge cost for western societies. Since so 
many behaviors in a society affect the health of its citizens we should try to 
reduce negative health impacts everywhere possible. Consequently areas such as 
consumer behavior, environment and climate, agriculture, public safety, housing 
and education can be included when trying to tackle the healthcare challenge (EC 
web HiAP).  
If policymakers have i) accepted the existence of the cognitive biases in the 
decision-making of citizens and ii) chosen a principle to use in terms of more or 
less libertarian or coercive paternalism, how and where should they apply these 
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decisions to work with these tasks? One suggestion drawn from the HiAP 
example above is to use a wider stance to reach maximal impact of the behavioral 
approach. Even though a behavioral approach would be instrumental rather than 
thematic (like the HiAP). There are a few ways to make sure that behavioral 
insights are widely considered when it is potentially feasible. The first way 
suggests that the legislative or executive body has to take an active stand on the 
potential for behavioral adjustments in almost every single policy. One downside 
to this way is that it risks to be neglected if falling into the trap of inertia. A less 
cynical but more practical problem is that policies and regulations that have 
already been decided will not be affected by the potential efficiency 
improvements. Another potential role for behavioralists in policymaking is to 
create a unit that acts as gatekeeper in areas with high potential for behavioral 
approaches. This unit could also act as a cold-case group and investigate the 
potential in old policies and regulations. The way in which any of these options 
could be implemented, however, has a lot to do with the characteristics of the 
political and administrative system in which it acts.  
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4 Methodological considerations 
4.1 A Qualitative Case-study 
As Yin (2003) suggests, case studies are often the preferred method when 
approaching why and how questions, when researchers has little control over 
events and when analyzing “a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context”. Since all these three suggestions fit strikingly well with the purpose and 
subject of this paper, the decision to conduct a case study was fairly 
straightforward. 
Data-wise this paper is an analysis of documents. When collecting data for 
this paper a lot of time was spent on understanding the population of potential 
cases and to collect all possible information regarding these cases. To gain 
understanding everything from newspaper articles to, policy documents, research 
papers and internal evaluations were processed. After having delimited and picked 
the cases for the study the collected data was narrowed down to a handful 
documents for every case. The main sources, from which the cases are analyzed, 
are official documents from the governments and administrations. These are, to a 
smaller extent, complemented with statements and texts from the officials that are 
not formally official. The unofficial documents are mainly used to gain an 
understanding on underlying explanations, but are not used to establish 
occurrences of actual events. A non-quantifiable processing of the material makes 
this paper a qualitative case study. 
4.2 Case selection 
The most crucial methodological consideration of this paper has been the picking 
of cases for studying the use of behaviorally informed policy-tools as a 
phenomenon. When scooping for possible cases it was soon obvious that potential 
cases were rather few and thereby selecting by, for example, random sampling 
would not be possible. The attention, in the search for valid cases, was then turned 
to a more purposive mode of sampling that borrows inspiration from the work of 
Jason Seawright & John Gerring (2008). In Seawright & Gerring’s paper “Case 
Selection Techniques in Case Study Research – A Menu of Qualitative and 
Quantitative options”, they explain how random picking (and pragmatic selection) 
many times is not possible to apply. At the same time as randomization has its 
insufficiencies, so do purposive case selection. Picking cases in a purposive 
manner will bring some intrinsic problems – often in play when working with 
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small-N samples – regarding the generalization of the cases and analytical results. 
Even so, purposive methods can, by helping researchers chose the most suitable 
cases, still make important contributions (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 295). The 
picking of cases in case-study research has the same two main objectives as 
random sampling due to Seawright & Gerring. To find: 
 
1) A representative sample, and 
2) Useful variation (in the light of the applied theory) 
(2008: 296) 
 
To be able to study the phenomenon of behaviorally informed policy-tools it is 
necessary to delimit the study to a few study objects. In this paper the choice was 
made to analyze objects that had not only been working with a single policy, but 
had a more concentrated use of behaviorally informed policy-tools. The picking of 
cases was conducted after the following characteristics/delimitations: 
 
1) A use of behavioral approaches in the public sphere 
2) Cognitive biases as a base for certain policy interventions 
3) An explicit statement of the use of behaviorally informed policy-tools 
4) A concentrated use of behaviorally informed policy tools 
5) A time span, starting with the economic crises in 2007-2008 up until 
today (May 2014) 
6) The behavioralist applications should have, or be directly tied to, 
legislative and executive powers in their respective administration 
 
After this delimitation the three most influential cases where chosen from the 
rather small population. The picking influential cases is most commonly used 
when analyzing small or moderate sized samples and when the researcher has 
reasons to believe that results are being driven by a few cases (Seawright & 
Gerring 2008: 303f.). The reason for choosing influential cases is that the studied 
phenomenon here is fairly new and the population is small. There are reasons to 
believe that these influential cases are driving the development of the use of 
behavioral policy tools, today as well as some time ahead. The aim of selecting 
influential cases is “to explore cases that may be influential vis-à-vis some larger 
cross-case theory” (Ibid.). In plain English this means that if smaller and less 
influential cases were added in the investigated scope it would not change the 
results in any major way. 
The reason for choosing three cases is a matter of balance between the 
limitations of words and the ability to analyze and present each case in a 
representative way. Together these delimitations will include many of the most 
influential applications of behaviorally informed policy and have as good 
representativeness as it gets, given the small population. An (unintended) effect of 
the case selection is that all the cases are western welfare states. 
If having sufficiently met the requirement of a “representative sample”, as 
stated by Seawright & Gerring (2008: 296), the next step is to consider if there is 
any “useful variation” among the cases. Useful variation is an often unrecognized 
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requirement in case study research (Ibid: 294). The need for useful variation is 
naturally crucial if case-study researchers are trying to establish causal 
mechanisms. While this paper somewhat isolates factors – the biases derived from 
the use of behaviorally informed interventions – there has not been any intention 
to establish any causal explanations. This paper focuses on theories, ideas and 
strategies that have been boiled down to an essence by using the cases as a filter. 
The most interesting variation between the cases in this paper is the different roles 
the case units have in their respective administration, and what policy areas their 
competence includes. This will be discussed further in the introduction to each 
case.  
The generalizability of the cross comparisons of the cases in this paper is most 
likely limited. It should also be emphasized that it is the phenomenon – 
behaviorally informed policy – that is in focus and not the cases themselves, 
making it more of a theory consuming study rather than a theory testing.  
The three cases might not be very generalizable one by one, but together they 
should be attributed a fair amount of representativeness regarding how 
governments in the western welfare states (can) use behavioral policy-tools 
strategically. When they use it. As this could be considered a quite new approach 
by governments, it is however likely that new ways of applying behaviorally 
theories will emerge. This would of course temper with the generalizability of this 
paper and complementary studies would be needed to maintain representativeness. 
At the same time, looking at the most influential cases – that are likely to 
influence future work on the behavioral area – might give the study life for yet a 
while. The main contribution of this paper lies not in cross comparisons between 
the cases, but in the collected examples of in-practice use all together.  
A note on ‘selection’ should also be made regarding the cases within the cases 
in this paper. Since the actors in each case have conducted many different 
behavioral interventions, how have the presented examples been chosen? The 
answer is that the examples are not directly analyzed themselves. Approaches and 
strategies are analyzed and the cases within the cases are mainly used as 
pedagogical means when communicating the analysis. Indirectly the case 
examples are analyzed as a part of the overall approaches and strategies. 
  30 
5 The cases 
5.1 The adoption into policymaking 
So, how have the behavioral theories regarding the cognitive biases and the 
suggested solutions been received in government administrations around the 
world? Since many of the ideas are still fairly new it is likely that the ideas will, if 
not have a greater deal of influence, at least be ventilated more in political 
deliberations in the future. As an example, the European Commission has shown 
an increased interest in applying behavioral sciences to the EU policymaking, 
both by arranging recurrent international conferences14 on the theme and 
investigating the potential in in-house reports (Bavel et al. 2013).  
As we have also seen in chapter 2 the status quo and the default heuristics 
make a possible answer to why business is conducted as usual also in 
policymaking. However, some administrations seem to have been able to 
challenge the status quo somewhat. In the US Barack Obama recruited Nudge-
author Cass Sunstein to the White house under some controversy in 2009. The 
other Nudge-author Richard Thaler has been acting as policy advisor to Denmark, 
France and the UK. In the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron even established a 
Behavioral insights team in 2010. The UK should be considered the pioneer and 
the most extensive and influential user of behavioral approaches in policymaking 
to this date, by far. This makes the UK an obvious case and a natural starting point 
when looking into cases where behavioral approaches have been applied. The US 
is mainly considered an influential case because of Nudge advocate, Cass 
Sunstein, who has had the role, both as a theorist and a practitioner within the US 
context. Finally the smaller EU case, is picked because of its outspoken 
willingness to apply behavioral ideas and because their influential and reoccurring 
high level conferences on the subject. 
5.2 Structure of the analysis 
To connect the analysis of the empirical cases to the theoretical chapters (2 and 3), 
and later be able to compare the relevant parts of the cases, a well-structured case 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
14 The 3rd behavioral economics conference organized by the European Commission was held at October 30th 
2013 (Mimica 2013). 
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presentation is crucial. The empirical cases chosen for this paper have been 
analyzed using 3 main questions: 
 
1) How is the work with behavioral insight justified and what role does the 
behavioral applications have in the respective case? 
2) On which cognitive biases are the behaviorally informed work based and 
how? 
3) Which debiasing approach are used?  
 
Question 1) is meant to give a short background to work on behavioral insights in 
each case, but also to connect – if possible – to the introduction chapter (1) 
regarding the economical crisis and alternative low-cost policy. The first question 
also addresses the purpose of the behaviorally informed work as well as the role 
of the behavioral applications in the different administrations. Question 2) is 
answered by analyzing the empirical material using the knowledge about 
cognitive biases presented in chapter 2. The biases are presented in a theoretical 
way but are drawn from practical work. Examples of such work are also presented 
briefly. Question 3) corresponds with the debiasing approaches that were 
presented in chapter 3 and the reasoning on soft versus hard paternalism as 
solutions.  
5.3 The UK– The Nudge Unit  
5.3.1 Birth, role and justification 
In the Pensions Act 2008 the UK switched the default regarding occupational 
pension plans to a system where workers were automatically subscribed to a 
pension plan instead of having to sign up for a plan (opt-in). Workers can then 
choose to opt-out if they prefer. This action by the UK parliament, which came 
into force in 2012, could be seen as one of the first major steps taken on the 
grounds of behavioral theory and default options as a nudge in the UK. After 
having seen very bleak results when using information and advice, politicians 
turned to this approach as a solution to the ‘last mile problem’ (Dolan et al. 2010: 
46). 
The Behavioral Insights Team (BIT) – or the ‘Nudge unit’ – in the UK was set 
up in July 2010. Before David Cameron became Prime Minister it is said that he 
was a believer in the behavioral ideas put forward by Thaler and Sunstein in their 
2008 bestseller ‘Nudge’ (The Economist 2014-02-07). After taking office, as 
Prime Minister, in May 2010 it only took the cabinet some two months to set up 
the BIT. 
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In 2009 the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service15 ordered a 
review of the implications of behavioral theory for policymaking. The task was 
assigned to the Institute for Government who investigated how behavioral theory 
was currently being used and what challenges were related to it (Dolan et al. 
2010: 6). The MINDSPACE framework, written by researchers in related subjects 
continued to be the overall guide to BIT in the initial years, and to a lesser extent 
it is still being used in 2014 (BIT 2014: 3). 
The BIT works mainly together with other parts of the UK administration to 
investigate, test and change different interventions on different behaviors. From 
this aspect the BIT could be considered an inter-institutional task force or 
consultant. In February 2014 it was declared that the BIT would become a 
partnership outside of the UK government. The state will maintain the new 
company’s biggest customer but it is now able to sell its services to other 
governments and administrations as well (Nesta web 2014, BIT 2014). 
Why then did the UK government turn to the findings of behavioral science 
and why at this very time? In the MINDSPACE report (Dolan et al. 2010) we are 
given some answers to this question:16 
 
• A time of fiscal constraints calls for new approaches in policymaking. 
• New relevant research with strong potential 
• New innovative ways to change behavior in areas that have previously 
proved to be hard to change (p. 13)17 
• A cheap but potentially powerful way to change civic behavior to the 
better 
• Soft paternalistic ways such as nudging is a “low pain way” to change 
civic behavior (p. 7) 
5.3.2 Targeted biases  
In the mnemonic “M-I-N-D-S-P-A-C-E” the most prominent biases, targeted by 
the UK, are concluded as18: 
 
v Messenger – we are heavily influenced by who communicates 
information 
v Incentives – our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable 
mental shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses 
v Norms – we are strongly influenced by what others do 
v Defaults – we ’go with the flow’ of pre-set options 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15 Sir Gus O’Donnell 
16 These bullet points () are a conclusion of the justifications and not a quotation from an actual bullet point list 
in the analyzed documents.  
17 E.g. exercising and antisocial behavior. 
18 These bullet points (v) are present in the analyzed documents, but have been narrowed down to its essence. 
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v Salience – our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant 
to us 
v Priming – our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues 
v Affect – our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions 
v Commitments – we seek to be consistent with our public promises, and 
reciprocate acts 
v Ego – we act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves 
 
(Dolan et al. 2010: 8) 
 
The BIT, in their work, initially used these nine elements then gradually 
discovered that it was a bit too complex (“to policymakers”) and that it, together 
with much of the academic literature, lacked some relevance when working with 
these theories in practice. The main effect that was lacking seems to have been the 
effect of simplification. Reducing friction was resulting in greater impact and the 
mnemonic was therefore reduced to four elements in the EAST framework (BIT 
2014:3). The new mnemonic and its main elements want adopters to make 
interventions: 
 
v Easy – use the power of defaults; reduce the ‘hassle’ to an action; 
simplify messages 
v Attractive – attract attention by using images, color and 
personalization; well designed rewards and sanctions 
v Social – draw on social conformity; use networks; encourage people to 
make a commitment to others  
v Timely – prompt when people are receptive; consider the immediate 
costs and benefits; Help people plan their response to events 
 
(BIT 2014: 3-6) 
 
The analysis of the use of biases in the UK case will focus mainly on the updated 
and reduced EAST-framework and the work related to it. The framework can be 
explained by the cognitive biases theory presented in chapter 2 in the following 
way: 
Easy – The BIT states that while the power of default options is widely 
exploited in the private sector – e.g. by the use of default settings on social 
networks sites or having unreasonably high ‘default tariffs’ on energy or 
telephone services – it is not taken into consideration by policymakers enough, 
yet. Automatic opt-in approaches in organ donation and pension plans have 
proven to have a substantial potential of increasing the impact. But, as the BIT 
points out, it can be highly debatable who should set such  defaults and how. 
Because of this, vigorous discussions about the relation between the use of 
behavioral insights and democratic aspects is a welcomed occurrence (2014: 10f.). 
 Another important part of the ‘easy’ element is simplification. As we saw 
when discussing the scarcity mindset and tunneling in chapter 2, simplification 
tends to have positive effects on anyone but especially on people who are worse 
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off and might be stuck in scarcity traps. As we also saw, in the example of 
simplified forms for applications to financial aid for college and what is 
sometimes believed to be an information problem (which it often also is): 
simplification reduces the taxation of the mental bandwidth and increases the 
potential for individuals to make more balanced choices and decisions. The BIT 
works with this by reducing “hassle” and “friction cost” for users in relation to a 
certain action. Certain potential is seen in enabling consumers to more easily be 
able to switch suppliers  (BIT 2014:12, 15). In the EAST framework it is, 
however, also pointed out that there are situations where simplification can have 
adverse effects. Such effects can sometimes also be used as a nudge. When 
regulation required paracetamol pills to be sold in blister packs the extra effort it 
took to get each pill out appears to have reduced the cases of paracetamol 
poisoning by 43 percent and deaths by 765 over a 11 year period (Hawton et al. 
2013; BIT 2014: 12). A main conclusion by the BIT, drawn from their work with 
simplification, is that it is often fruitful to adopt changes in stages rather than 
trying to change an entire behavior at once from scratch (BIT 2014: 18). 
Attractive – The attractiveness of a policy intervention mainly appeals to the 
intuitive and emotional parts of System 1. Successful commercials rarely aim at 
engaging the viewers reflective system. Also here the BIT states that the private 
sector is a much more frequent and extensive user of applying the biases 
connected to attraction. By personalizing messages, reframing the way in which 
incentives and choices are presented, the potential in designing attractive choice 
environments can be substantial also in the public sector. The framing of an 
option can potentially have a large impact on how people make their choices as 
discussed in 2.2.3.  
In an effort to increase the number of tax-registered vehicles in the UK the 
BIT worked together with the Driver & Vehicle Licensing Agency on redesigns of 
messages sent out to targeted citizens. The agencies created two new letters and 
tested the efficiency of those compared to the old letter. The first new letter was 
simplified and more threatening while the second new letter also had a picture of 
the person’s car on it. While the simplified version had fairly little impact the 
attached picture increased tax registration from the previous 40 percent to 47 
percent (BIT 2014: 20). The picture made the possibility of losing the car more 
salient than just threatening (with words) to take the car away. By combining the 
power of framing with the emotional reactions of System 1 and personalization, 
the agencies were able to raise tax obedience with very small means.  
 Another way to make an action more attractive is to connect rewards or 
incentives to them (BIT 2014: 18). Such rewards does not have to be a direct 
result of the benefits of a program but can be completely unrelated to the program 
and only work as a motivation tool to get citizens to engage. Rewards like this can 
make individuals engage where they otherwise will procrastinate or tunnel out the 
engagement in such a program. As we saw in chapter 2 unrelated rewards such as 
a kilogram of lentils could have a major impact on the larger policy problem; to 
vaccinate children in development countries (Banerjee et al. 2010).  
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Social – Due to the BIT social influences often go unnoticed. However, if 
policymakers can get insights on how these social influences operate it would 
most likely lead to more efficiently designed policies. 
Drawing on the social information bias (2.2.5) the BIT suggests working out 
nudges that appeal to the fact that ‘most other people’ behave in a certain way. In 
cooperation with HM Revenue & Customs the BIT have conducted a series of 
trials on this theme. By including information, on dispatches regarding tax 
payment, that most people had already paid their taxes, the tax payment rates 
increased significant (Hallsworth et al. 2014). 
Making promises to friends or social connections can also be an efficient way 
to have people act in a certain way or to follow a program until its end (BIT 2014: 
34). This mechanism can be considered in the light of the peer-pressure bias 
presented in 2.2.5. It has also been shown that individuals have a hard time 
meeting deadlines that are too far off in the future. If individuals set out part time 
deadlines and create material or social losses, if they fail to meet the deadlines, 
they are more likely to submit (Mullainatan & Shafir 2013: 22f.). This should be 
especially true if the loss would mean losing something the individual is already 
in possession of, as opposed to missing out on future gains (see 2.2.3 regarding 
loss aversion). Creating nudges in the form of ‘social deadlines’ should therefore 
be a potential way to induce behavior. Together with a job center in the UK the 
BIT introduced an intervention where job seekers were committing trough written 
statements to their job seeking advisors. Interestingly enough, the BIT has also 
introduced a similar commitment device for the members of their own team (BIT 
2014: 35). 
Timely – By bringing in the aspect of timing, the BIT wants to put more 
emphasis on the way in which policies are implemented and not regard this as a 
matter of smaller details. The BIT is even contemplating the concept of testing 
different points of interventions experimentally to see when impact is best (BIT 
2014: 37f.). Together with HM Courts Service the BIT conducted a trial where the 
effects of well-timed text messages were used as a way to increase fine payment 
rates. A moment was identified where there was still a chance to pay the fines and 
avoid a bailiffs procedure. The results showed that simply sending a well-timed 
text message doubled the payment rate and that if the messages were personalized 
the payment rate increased as much as three times compared to no text message at 
all (Heynes et al. 2013). Yet again we see that the use of a combination of biases 
seem to have a powerful potential when designing policy-interventions/nudges. 
As we saw when discussing the scarcity mindset in chapter 2, the point in time 
of an intervention can be crucial to the potential impact of the intervention. An 
informative intervention, with the intention of educating citizens regarding a 
certain task, requires more mental bandwidth which makes the importance of the 
‘when-factor’ even more tangible. The BIT points out that when identifying 
moments for interventions, periods of change in citizens’ lives should be 
considered scrutinously. When people are having a child, moving to another town 
or go to university they tend to be more receptive to interventions that can change 
their behavior. Since transition periods like these often also involve some contacts 
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with public administrations, the chances are often good to reach individuals at 
such times (BIT 2014: 39). 
5.3.3 Debiasing approach 
If the MINDSPACE and EAST frameworks have set out the theoretical approach 
to the UK’s and BIT’s work with behavioral approaches, there is another 
document that stated the methodological approach. The work of BIT is to a vast 
degree based on an empirical approach where behavioral theory and Randomized 
Controlled Trials19 (RCTs) are used to test behavior in a specific context. The 
BIT’s own main strategy paper: Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy 
with Randomised Controlled Trials, very distinctively points out the use of RCTs 
as the main tool for identifying and strategically counter cognitive biases, mainly 
by the use of nudges (BIT 2012: ch. 1). 
When analyzing the cognitive biases targeted in the BITs work, focus was 
mainly put at the EAST framework. However, when looking into the overall 
approach and strategy, most of the ideas have not changed since the 
MINDSPACE framework. In the final chapter of the MINDSPACE report it is 
explained how policymakers can put the presented behavioral strategies into 
practice and target the cognitive biases. Already in the early steps of the work 
with applying behavioral insights in a more specific way, the idea of soft 
paternalistic methods were suggested as the main approach in the UK (2010: 7). 
Important to note is that there is an emphasis on the complementary role of 
behavioral tools rather than replacing such tools (Ibid: 10). While this 
complementary tool might be merely soft paternalistic it could i.e. be combined 
with coercive tools. Such coercive tools (legislation and regulation) however, goes 
outside of what the BIT is officially working with. 
In the MINDSPACE report it is also reflected upon the potential legitimacy 
problem when trying to shift civic behavior. This connects directly to the theories 
regarding paternalism that were presented in chapter 3 and what kind of harm that 
calls for paternalistic interventions. The most prominent point made is that 
legitimacy is higher when trying to prevent harm to others (e.g. safer 
communities) than when trying to promote benefits to self (e.g. healthier lifestyle) 
(2010: 65). However, the obvious problem of being able to always separate an 
action that causes harm to others from an action that causes harm to self is not 
reflected upon. Leading an unhealthy lifestyle in a universal welfare state could, 
in the longer run, very well be seen as harm to others by undermining the 
premises of the very foundation of the welfare state. Reflecting further on self-
harm in the report, the authors state that before conducting intervening nudges, 
that affect individuals, it should be proven that the targeted behavior is actually 
reducing the individual’s well being. The final line, regarding the harm issue, is 
that soft paternalism requires less justification than coercive paternalism (Ibid). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 Experimental studies. 
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Because of this, soft paternalistic tools can be seen as quicker and easier to use, 
something that can be important when policymakers look down in the policy 
toolbox.  
So far trials and nudges have only been investigating civic behavior as a single 
group without any segmentation. In the future the BIT aims at creating trials that 
enables them to see how different social groups may react differently to certain 
kinds of interventions. The strategy initially also was to work with fairly simple 
behaviors because they were easier to measure. But moving forward with works 
on job centers etc. the unit aims at target more complex behaviors (BIT 2014: 50). 
5.3.4 Concluding the UK analysis 
• Justification: see bullet points in 5.2.1 
• Mainly an empirically based approach to behavioral theory. Behavioral theory 
is used to test specific cases and then apply changes rather than applying wide 
theories directly into policymaking 
• The BIT targets a number of biases: the status quo bias, social conformity 
biases, scarcity and tunneling biases, framing bias and emotional biases in 
System 1. 
• Soft paternalistic approach or, more specifically, libertarian paternalism and 
nudges. Open for complementary soft/hard paternalistic strategies  
• The BIT has a corporative role as an internal task force (up until now) 
5.4 The US– The Bureaucrat Gatekeeper 
5.4.1 Birth, role and justification 
Much like David Cameron in the UK, it is said that Barak Obama has been a long 
time fan of nudging and behavioral insights to policymaking; even that President 
Obama is a “nudge politician” or “behavioralist” (e.g. NYRB 2008). 
In 2008 nudge theorist and law scholar Cass Sunstein was elected to the post 
as administrator for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) by 
president Obama. The process of getting Sunstein into office was however 
everything but quick and easy since it is widely understood that OIRA is s little 
office with a big impact. While the libertarian-paternalism concept aims at 
reaching out to a bipartisan audience, many republicans seemed to have a hard 
time accepting Sunstein entering the White house on such a crucial position. This 
resulted in Sunstein being blocked by several republican senators in a row before 
finally being allowed to enter the White house as the OIRA Administrator in 2009 
(e.g. New York Times 2009; Sunstein 2013). 
OIRA is a federal office established by Congress in the 1980 Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA). It is part of the Office of Management and Budget, an 
agency within the executive office of the President. There are both political 
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appointees and civil servants working in OIRA. The head of the office is the 
OIRA Administrator. The formal duties of OIRA are set out, mainly, in the PRA 
and in executive order 12866 (Clinton 1993), which were reemphasized by 
Obama in executive order 13563 in 2011. Given in the PRA, OIRA has the task to 
review all collections of information carried out by the federal government. No 
federal authority has the right to issue any new paper work on the American 
people if OIRA has not approved of it. Under executive order 12866 the unit has 
the task to oversee draft regulation, which means in practice that OIRA has the 
power to delay or halt regulations. Finally, a less formal part of OIRAs work is its 
power to help shaping the president’s agenda (Exec. Order 12866; Exec. Order 
13563; Sunstein 2013: 1-5). 
To put the role of OIRA in the context of the legislative and executive powers, 
it is best seen as a hub between the legislative power (Congress) and the executive 
power, when dealing with regulations. When Congress has decided upon 
regulation there is sometimes a need to clarify certain aspects regarding the 
implementation before handing it over to the executive agencies. The relevant 
agencies and other stakeholders are also supposed to have a chance to give their 
opinion on a draft regulation. This is where OIRA comes in (Sunstein 2013: 30). 
In policy analysis the pros and cons of writing detailed policies compared to more 
‘open’ policies are commonly discussed. Here units like OIRA acts as gatekeepers 
who (hopefully) reduce the hassle for the agencies that are assigned the 
implementation of the regulation. 
Apart from the leading OIRA documents this analysis will also look into 
memorandums20 21 22 from OIRA and Sunstein’s own descriptions (2013) of the 
time as administrator from 2009 to 2012. 
A relevant question is, of course, why the US government, through OIRA, 
chose to direct efforts towards a behavioral perspective on regulation. If they 
actually did so and how are dealt with in the sections below, but the main reasons 
for this direction seem to be: 
 
• Often more efficient than direct regulation 
• Low cost way to change behavior (Exec. Order 13563) 
• Low pain way to change behavior, by maintaining freedom of choice 
(Ibid) 
5.4.2 Targeted biases 
In the case of OIRA and the US government, the work on behavioral theory is not 
stipulated directly in the main documents (see 5.4.1) that state OIRA’s duties. 
However, the orders leave room for the potential use of such ideas. There are parts 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
20 Memorandum on ”Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory Tools” (OIRA 2010/6). 
21 Memorandum on “Executive Order 13563, ’Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review’” (OIRA 2011/2). 
22 Memorandum on “Informing Consumers through Summary Disclosure” (OIRA 2011/9). 
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of executive order 12866 that are more or less implying the use of behavioral 
theory: 
 
Each agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct 
regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the de- 
sired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing 
information upon which choices can be made by the public. 
(Section 1, principle 3) 
 
In executive order 13563 President Obama enhances the wish for nudge-tools to 
be used, when possible, by stating: “[E]ach agency shall identify and consider 
regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of 
choice for the public”. Examples are also presented in the order pointing out 
default rules and disclosure requirements. To reduce burdens and maintain 
freedom of choice is almost the definition of a nudge as explained in 3.2. The 
formulations correspond very well with libertarian paternalism and the use of 
nudges as a less direct and less coercive form of policy. The expressions in 
executive order 12866 and 13563 are translated into more behavioral terms in 
OIRAs memorandum 2010/6. There are mainly two ways that OIRA advocates to 
adapt to cognitive biases: simplification and disclosure. 
Simplification could, in some sense, be seen as an OIRA duty even before an 
apparent behavioral perspective was added through a memorandum in June 2010 
(OIRA 2010/6). These elements are explicitly drawn from the statues of executive 
order 12866, but are also forged together with a behavioral theory derived from 
cognitive biases. Even though “simplification” in itself might not be a very 
specific nudge, it can include other more specific nudges. One powerful nudge 
that OIRA have put under the simplification banner is the use of “default rules, 
such as automatic enrollment, to simplify people’s decisions” (2010/6: 9). 
Agencies should consider, what would be the outcome if citizens make no choice 
at all in a specific situation. The argued use of default rules to simplify is justified 
by drawing on human flaws such as procrastination and inertia. The default rule 
also has potential to be regarded as the endorsed option. The bottom line of the 
recommendation from OIRA is to use default rules or options – as the desired 
alternative – together with an opt-out possibility (Ibid.). Procrastination is closely 
linked to the tunneling issue presented in 2.2.7 and the power of inertia in relation 
to endorsed default options is explained in 2.2.5. 
Another side of the simplification element is that simplification can have 
crucial impacts on whether or not people are engaging in certain programs. If 
application procedures are to daunting or complex many citizens are likely to not 
participate or enroll. This is another reason why OIRA are focusing on 
simplification (OIRA 2010/6: 10). As discussed both in the theory section (2) and 
in the UK case, simplification of forms and applications to programs are likely to 
be helpful to anyone, but especially helpful to people who are worse off, have low 
income or no experience of tertiary education in the family. 
Disclosure (as a regulatory tool) should not be seen as having any real 
intrinsic nudge-value regardless of what kind of disclosure we are talking about. 
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Just pouring out information in society is not a meaningful nudge. If designed in a 
proper way, by using behavioral insights, it could however have good nudge 
potential: 
 
People have limited time, attention, and resources for seeking out new 
information, and it is important to ensure that relevant information is salient 
and easy to find and to understand. There is a difference between making a 
merely technical disclosure — that is, making information available 
somewhere and in some form, regardless of its usefulness — and actually 
informing choices. Well-designed disclosure policies are preceded by a 
careful analysis of their likely effects. 
(OIRA 2010/6: 3) 
 
The memorandum continues by explaining two main types of disclosure: 
summary disclosure and full disclosure. A summary disclosure is often related to 
the purchase of a product, such as nutrition facts on packages, while full 
disclosure is what agencies often use in an act of transparency (OIRA 2010/6: 3). 
In the memorandum, signed by Cass Sunstein, OIRA wants agencies to 
contemplate over their use of disclosure and, by doing so, increase the efficiency 
when facilitating new or changed regulations. 
If simplification and disclosure are the two main type of nudges used by OIRA 
and agencies connected to them, how are these nudges explained by the theories 
on cognitive biases, presented in chapter 2? Starting off, simplification and 
disclosure are interconnected. A user-friendly disclosure of information is most 
likely a rather simple one, at least when viewing it from a citizen’s perspective. 
As mentioned above simplification is helpful to any one, but often especially to 
the people who are worse of in society. Simplified procedures can engage more 
people from groups that are considered “worse off”. This draws on the scarcity 
mindset and the concept of tunneling presented in 2.2.7. Another part of the 
simplification principles deals explicitly with default option nudges drawn from 
the status quo bias presented in 2.2.5. While a default option would not have any 
advantages over other alternatives in the eyes of a rational agent (Econ), it does 
have significant advantages when an actual person is making a choice – or 
abstains from making any choice. 
Disclosure on the other hand can be used as a simpler form of nudge. As 
Sunstein writes: “Summary disclosure should be designed for System 1, not 
System 2” (2013: 93, 79). In the US case disclosure as a nudge draws on mainly a 
few cognitive biases. First there is the rather obvious advantage that disclosure 
might have on individual decision-making (if the information is adopted): choices 
are more likely to be made in System 2 (reflective) than in System 1 (intuitive). A 
well-designed disclosure can then, potentially, induce individuals to make an 
informed and deliberated choice and bypass the biases of System 1.  
Ironically though, certain types of disclosure can target the shortcomings of 
System 1 and instead induce decisions on a more emotional basis (much like some 
commercials does). An example of this, as suggested by OIRA, is the use of vivid 
descriptions and persuasive images when disclosing information (2010/6: 4). In 
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practice this strategy has been used in many countries when putting on horrific 
images on cigarette packs. 
Yet another cognitive bias, targeted by OIRA, is the power of framing 
disclosed information in a smart way. This means to, when opportunity is given, 
use the fact that Humans are loss averse. By framing potential outcomes as a loss 
rather than a gain it will attract more attention and citizens are more likely to 
engage (OIRA 2010/6: 4). 
Much like in the BIT, OIRA sees timing of interventions, like disclosure, as a 
crucial element to facilitate regulation or behavioral change directly. This can 
mean to consider how to get the fuel-economy information out in the right 
moment just before a purchase of a car (OIRA 2010/6: principle a4).  
5.4.3 Debiasing approach 
When entering the position of OIRA administrator in 2009 it was no secret from 
Sunstein’s side (or to any one else) that the work of OIRA would be directed a bit 
towards nudging and libertarian paternalism, when opportunities were given 
(Sunstein 2013: 2). This can also be established by looking at the more formal 
work of OIRA where there are obvious pushes for the use of soft rather than 
coercive paternalistic interventions when trying to reach policy goals.  
As cited above, from executive order 13563, “[E]ach agency shall identify and 
consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and 
freedom of choice for the public”. This is pretty much as close as it gets without 
putting the actual labels ‘nudge’ or ‘libertarian paternalism’ on the approaches. 
OIRA on their hand expresses the use of specific nudges like default rules. 
 
To promote regulatory goals, agencies should consider whether it is 
appropriate to use default rules (such as automatic enrollment) as a substitute 
for, or as a supplement to, mandates or bans.  
(OIRA 2010/6: 10) 
 
The use of softer means – as compared to bans – are justified by their ability to 
maintain freedom of choice and to allow a diversity where individual 
circumstances makes a ban unlikely to fit everyone. It is also considered a low 
cost intervention compared to mandates. Default options are especially fruitful 
when “agencies have reason to be confident about the appropriate default rule, 
and when preferences and situations are not relevantly diverse” or when the 
technicalities and complexity implies that citizens will lack experience and 
expertise to make an appropriate choice (Ibid: 10f.). 
At the same time, the complementary role of nudges is pointed out. Soft 
paternalistic interventions – like nudges – are not a complete solution that is 
always optimal, but one that should seriously be considered in many cases (Ibid.). 
Even if coercive means – which require citizens to engage by law – are used, this 
is no insurance against people still not obeying that law for different reasons. This 
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is where coercive and libertarian paternalism can have an important 
complementary potential. 
As an alternative to default rules, with an automatic opt-in, OIRA argues for 
the use of active choosing as a nudge. This approach is recommended when there 
is a lack of knowledge about what is a preferred choice for a certain population23 
(OIRA 2010/6: 11; Sunstein 2013: 119ff.). An active choosing procedure requires, 
or even coerces, individuals to make an active choice. Since there is no way to 
avoid making a choice, there is no default option. How should people then be 
forced to make active choices? Suggestions claim that it could be solved by 
connecting these kinds of choices to a final step before getting certain licenses, 
benefits or before being allowed to enter a new job. Before getting your driver’s 
license you will have to make an active choice on organ donation etcetera 
(Sunstein 2013: 119). But then again, outcomes will depend heavily on how the 
questions are framed and which default is used when framing the question (see 
2.2.3; 2.2.4; Kahneman 2011: 373).  
In section 3.4 there was a presentation of different types of choices. Mainly 
two choices were highlighted: the aggregated choice and the personalized choice. 
What is suggested in the US case is that default options should be used when 
deciding on aggregated choices and active choosing should be applied when 
dealing with more diverse personalized choices. Obviously there are no hard lines 
made and this should be regarded as more of a thumb rule. There are also obvious 
limitations to the use of active choosing because of its mandatory nature. 
One important difference between the BIT and OIRA is that the former works 
mainly with nudges and behavioral approaches while the OIRA have wide 
possibilities to use these approaches but they are not delimited to only such tools. 
On the other hand, OIRA do not have the capacity to conduct their own 
behavioral experiments like the BIT does. OIRA is limited to suggest to other 
parts of the public administration to, where it is possible, conduct experiments to 
guide their work (Exec. Order 12866: 5; OIRA 2010/06). This makes the US a 
case of theory-based approach rather than an empirical approach such as in the 
UK. 
5.4.4 Concluding the US analysis 
• Soft paternalistic interventions are low cost, low pain ways that may be 
more effective than coercive regulation 
• Theory based approach; no direct capacity of conducting trials 
• Targeted biases by OIRA is mainly: the status quo bias, loss aversion and 
framing bias, tunneling bias and System 1 and System 2 biases (through 
disclosure) 
• Simplification, defaults and disclosure in focus 
• The role of a gatekeeper and gentle bureaucrat  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 Population as a group of citizens, not the population of a whole country. 
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5.5 The EU – The Protective Behavioralist  
5.5.1 Birth, role and justification 
The EU was in fact, in a minor way, one of the first adopters of behavioral 
approaches when the European Commission (EC), in October 2008, challenged 
the default-option rational by suggesting a ban on the use of pre-checked boxes in 
consumer contracts. Extra charges when purchasing online products were i.e. 
swapped from sometimes being pre-checked (default) to always being unchecked, 
requiring an active consumer choice (EC MEMO/11/675; EC 2008/0196).24 
The EU does not have a specific application working with behavioral insights. 
The EU does, on the other hand, have a number of initiatives that derives 
explicitly from behavioral findings and theories. Since it is the Commission that 
has the power to both initiate and execute regulation it is here we find the work 
informed by behavioral theory in the EU. Most of the work has been conducted by 
the Directorate General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO). Since both 
health policy and consumer protection policy are areas with large theoretical 
potential for the use of behaviorally informed regulation, this was no accidental 
starting point. The approaches have since spread to other parts of the Commission. 
Consumer behavior remains the most prominent area for the use of these 
approaches in the EU, whether it is DG SANCO, DG Environment or DG 
Research and Innovation that use it for their respective perspectives (Ciriolo 2011: 
2). Both studies and behaviorally informed policy initiatives are expected in the 
near future due to the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC)  (Bavel et al. 2013). 
The role of the behavioralist applications in the Commission has so far been 
very thematic. As Ciriolo points out, consumer behavior is the lowest common 
denominator when it comes to behaviorally informed work in the EU (2011: 2). 
This likely derives from the potential to use behavioral theory in this specific 
policy area. Consumer policy, however, has the potential to affect many other, for 
the EU, relevant policy areas such as health and environmental policy. 
Presented by the European Commissioner for consumer policy, Neven 
Mimica, there are a number of challenges that behavioral insights can meet that 
justifies its use that: 
 
• An increased diversity of products and services make the number of 
choices each individual has to make overwhelming 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
24 The directive was formally adopted by the Parliament and member states in October 2011 (EC 
MEMO/11/675; EC 2011: art. 22). 
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• The time in which a purchase can be made is today down to seconds  
• The importance of enabling consumers to feel confident, empowered 
and to have a fair chance within the competitive environment in which 
they make their choices.  
(Mimica 2013) 
5.5.2 Targeted biases 
The EUs focus on consumer behavior and protection is easily recognized in their 
in-practice use of behavioral theory. These are their main interventions draw from 
behavioral theory on cognitive biases. 
As mentioned initially in this section, EC drew on behavioral theory when 
banning pre-checked boxes for additional costs in consumer contracts. It was in 
the Consumer Rights Directive (EC 2011/83: article 22) that the Commission 
introduced this regulation, meaning no additional costs – as a result of pre-
checked boxed – are a legally binding part of the contract and should therefore be 
reimbursed (Ibid). The action taken by the EU targeted (among many other 
things) the exploitation, by traders, of the status-quo bias. By forcing traders to 
have all ‘additional-cost boxes’ unchecked the behavioral theory tells us that this 
will likely have a major impact on the number of additional costs paid. 
The next behaviorally informed intervention has to do with something as 
specific as web browsers for PCs. For a long time software manufacturer 
Microsoft delivered their operating system Windows with their own web browser 
Internet Explorer preinstalled [as the default option]. The Commission was – in 
line with their antitrust efforts – uneasy with the potential consequences of what 
Microsoft’s market dominance in the PC market would lead to. They argued that 
such dominance deprives consumers of choice. In 2009 Microsoft offered to 
remove this barrier for competition and in 2010 users were supposed to face the 
new active choice design and face a new “choice screen”25 when launching their 
Windows Internet application. In 2012, the Commission expressed criticism on 
Microsoft’s non-compliance on the legally binding agreement from 2009 and in 
2013 the Commission fined the company €561 million for the non-compliance 
(EC web 2013; EC 2013/6; EC 2012/10). Instead of a pre-checked box, this 
approach requires consumers to make an active choice. Evidently this nudge 
intervention draws on the fact that the status quo bias will cause many consumers 
to stay with the default browser; not because it is their preferred choice but 
because it is the endorsed default that requires no effort to use. An active choice 
approach, to counter the status quo bias, is likely to be beneficial if the choice is 
not too complex and in situations where users can be forced to make an active 
choice (cf. 2.2.5 and 3.4).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
25 The choice-screen makes it possible for users to choose one or more out of 12 possible web browsers. The 
browsers will be presented with information from their producers. The choice screen shall be available for 5 
years (EC web 2013). 
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In the line of harmonization initiatives from EC, the Health and Nutritional 
Claims Regulation (No. 1924/2006) was presented in 2007 and aimed at regulate 
the reference points [or anchoring points] for certain nutritional claims on 
products and in marketing campaigns. Among other streamlining features for the 
inner market, this regulation targeted the framing bias where products with 20% 
fat previously could have been presented as 80% fat free (Ciriolo 2011: 2; EC 
1924/2006). In this case EC did not, itself, use the fact that humans are susceptible 
to framing. Instead EC countered commercial exploitation of the framing bias. 
Since most of the EUs work with behaviorally informed policies have been to stop 
this kind of consumer exploitation, drawn on default and framing biases, ECs in-
practice strategy can be concluded as mainly protective. 
Another side of the Health and Nutritional Claims Regulation is the obvious 
disclosing purpose. By regulating the use of summary disclosures allowed on 
products the consumers will have an easier task when making informed choices. 
Simplifying and presenting comparable information on foodstuff makes it possible 
to make reflective System 2 choices. If there is no comparable information 
consumers can either put a lot of effort into making informed choices, or just 
make intuitive choices in System 1. 
5.5.3 Debiasing approach 
The European Union has through the Commission started to work with 
behaviorally informed policy. While EC have put out calls on behavioral 
experiments both in their framework programs (e.g. Consent 2013) and internally, 
they have not yet used experimental methods such as pilot studies to guide their 
work on behavioral policy-tools. The EUs take to the use of this kind of tools 
should thus, so far, be described as a theoretical approach. 
The theoretical approach used is mainly the soft paternalistic but there are also 
hard paternalistic elements, such as in the web browser case. While this 
behaviorally informed action, by the Commission, is justified through the 
importance of fair competition on the European market, it is a fairly coercive 
intervention. It does increase the number of choices for consumers but it also, for 
sure, changes the economic incentives for the targeted trader (Microsoft). 
Therefore it cannot be considered a nudge, but should be regarded more as a hard 
paternalistic regulation. As discussed in section 3.5 not all cases are obvious 
examples of a soft respectively hard paternalistic approach. The ban on pre-
checked boxed in 5.5.2 could possibly be considered an ‘in-betweener’, to some 
traders this could force them to completely rearrange their marketing strategies. 
Since policy actions like this are carried out primarily for the sake of 
harmonization of the European inner market, the aim is to level the playing field 
for all traders to avoid asymmetrical competition between EU countries. 
5.5.4 Concluding the EU analysis 
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• Protecting and empowering consumers in their choice environments 
• Thematic role with consumer behavior in focus 
• EU challenges the framing bias, the status-quo bias and the exploitation of 
System 1 decisions 
• Mainly protective use of nudges or ’counter nudges’. However, some 
interventions are coercive by law for traders 
• Theoretical approach when applying behavioral insights 
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6 Conclusions 
The roles of the behavioral applications in the different cases differ quite a bit. 
What was not as expected was that also the justifications – or the answer to the 
why-question – differed quite a lot. The behavioralist applications in the cases of 
this paper have chosen to work mainly with soft paternalistic nudges and the most 
profound justification for that is to maintain citizens freedom of choice. Another 
important justification is that it is an often inexpensive way with large potential to 
change civic behavior. This connects to the reasons for applying behavioral 
insights to policymaking at this very time, 2007-2014. Just as a non-legislative 
policy is likely easier to find democratic support for, a low cost policy tool is 
more likely to be voted through, and thus easier to use. Since the economic crises 
of 2008 an inexpensive policy tool could be found attractive, both out of 
economic and democratic bargaining reasons. The most evident examples of hard 
paternalistic interventions are found in the EU case where economic incitements 
for traders are somewhat sacrificed for the good of market competition and 
empowerment of consumers. 
Moving over to the how-question; the most prominent interventions, drawn 
from behavioral insights on cognitive biases, can be concluded as: default 
settings, simplification and smart disclosure. The use of default options or default 
rules, as a way to counter the status quo bias, have in some cases been put aside in 
favor of an active-choice procedure that acts as a nudge on the same bias. 
Simplification and smart disclosure have a more complex connection to the 
biases. Simplification is a way to reduce unnecessary taxation of citizens’ mental 
bandwidth, which is especially important when trying to engage underprivileged 
groups or the uneducated in policy programs. Smart disclosure, a behaviorally 
informed use of summary disclosure, should be designed for the intuitive System 
1, be easy to understand and compare to other products, services or alternatives. A 
smart disclosure also includes appealing to the framing bias and sometimes also to 
social conformity biases.  
As shown in the cases, behavioral insights on cognitive biases can be used as a 
way for governments or public administrations to: 
• Use engaging nudges to gain attention and engage citizens in programs – 
as in the case with OIRA and their advocating of the use of framing and 
loss aversion when formulating messages to citizens. Or as in the case 
with default options, used both in the US and in the UK.  
• Regulate commercial exploitation of the biases through protective 
interventions – as in the EU case when regulating the use of framing in 
marketing concepts such as “fat-free” or when safeguarding the market 
competition and consumer choice in antitrust cases like the web browser 
case. 
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Behaviorally informed policy tools, or at least framed in this way, is a fairly new 
concept and many of the impacts from its interventions cannot be properly 
evaluated yet since the impact requires yet some time to set in the systems. 
However, we can already see some lines of strategy taking shape where 
behavioral insights have been applied to policymaking. 
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7 Further discussion 
7.1.1 Democratic aspects 
While not being a main concern for the topic of this paper, there are interesting 
reflections to be made in the outskirts of the topic. There is an obvious distinction 
in how for example OIRA and BIT are working that could be analyzed in the light 
of the respective democratic system. While the UK government has a large degree 
of power of action in their own hands, the US government is to a much larger 
extent depending on bipartisan agreements. This has likely caused a sensitiveness 
regarding the work of OIRA, especially in its role to influence the precedent’s 
agenda. This of course makes the analysis of OIRA’s role as presidential adviser 
very hard and treacherous.  
A more overall point regarding the democratic aspect has to do with politics 
and accountability of politicians. Using behavioral theory by empirically testing 
the policy outcomes before applying them on the whole population has one major 
upside and one major downside to politicians (agents). The upside is that since 
experimental testing like RCTs are widely considered to be the ultimate 
evaluation method when assessing impact and causal effects, politicians can just 
raise their shoulders and say “we tried our best”, if a policy intervention goes 
south. On the downside, and maybe a bit more cynically – politicians may 
sometimes have a need to create policy that they know are not very good policy – 
because it might be a great political or rhetorical move. If an RCT is necessary to 
conduct before making such a move it could act as an unwanted gatekeeper from 
the perspective of the politician.  More research on these and other democratic and 
policy process aspects should be fruitful in the future when the behaviorally 
informed interventions have had some time to set in the administrations. 
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8 Executive Summary 
8.1 Subject and outline 
During the last few decades, research on human behavior – or more specifically 
the mapping of cognitive biases – has made some groundbreaking discoveries. 
The start is often attributed to the research of Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman 
in their 1974 work Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. These 
biases are systematic errors of our minds and do not only affect some unfortunate 
individuals with bad character. They affect all of us; usually without us knowing. 
The implications of cognitive biases can be dealt with both on an individual 
and a collective level. It is the collective way to handle these biases, through 
policy and regulation, that is in focused in this paper.  
The year 2008 is often considered the start of the economic crisis that still 
today haunts citizens and governments around the world. The same year scholars 
Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein presented a basic manual on how to apply 
behavioral insights to policymaking, in their book Nudge – Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth and Happiness. The ideas from this book are likely, by far, 
the most influential theory on cognitive biases that have been adopted and applied 
by governments. The approach argued for by Thaler & Sunstein is a soft 
paternalistic version entitled Libertarian Paternalism (2003, 2008). The 
libertarian paternalistic solution to the cognitive biases is to use nudges as smaller 
changes in citizens’ choice environments. If strategically picked, such small 
changes could potentially have major impacts on civic behavior. To be defined as 
a nudge, an intervention has to be choice preserving and non-coercive. Other 
scholars, like Sarah Conly (2013) have argued that the knowledge on cognitive 
biases calls for more drastic policy-implications and government actions. While 
soft paternalistic actions might be able to save many citizens from making crucial 
biased decisions regarding their lives, it will still be possible for citizens to make 
such inferior decisions. Thus, a number of citizens will still make inferior 
decisions and suffer the consequences. Conly calls for a coercive response to this 
problem and argues that we cannot sacrifice these failing citizens for the greater 
good of maintaining the illusion of autonomous individual free choice. 
Regardless if we prefer a more paternalistic or a mainly libertarian approach, 
the inherent potential of cognitive biases and its policy-implications calls for 
multidisciplinary research on the subject. Social and political scientists, natural 
scientists as well as philosophers need to converge and contribute with their 
angles to the bigger picture. We might not have stumbled upon a magic cure to 
social problems but if, how and where these behavioral insights can be used in a 
valid way, deserves to be examined thoroughly. 
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By conducting case studies of the main adopters of behavioral theory in the 
UK, the US and the EU there is a hope that this paper can somehow contribute to 
the examination of the potential of behaviorally informed policy tools. The main 
contribution consists of scrutinizing the discrepancy between theory and practical 
use of the cognitive biases. 
This paper is focused on the policy implications of cognitive biases and how 
these can be, and have been, ‘debiased’ in policymaking. How such work can be 
conducted is answered by presenting a theoretical framework that forges together 
scientific knowledge, on the cognitive biases (ch. 2), with philosophical 
approaches on paternalism (ch. 3). The question of how such work has been 
conducted is answered by looking at in-practice use, of this kind of behaviorally 
informed theory, in governmental institutions that have chosen to apply it to parts 
of their policymaking.  
 
The research question for this paper is:  
 
What ideas and strategies, based on the knowledge on cognitive biases, have been 
applied, in practice, by government administrations in their policymaking? 
       
This question is answered by breaking it down into two parts: 
 
1) Why do administrations choose to apply behavioral approaches into 
policymaking? 
2) How have government administrations been working with behavioral 
theory as a policy tool? 
 
The questions are answered by analyzing public documents together with some 
complementary documents from previous research and narratives from the work 
of the studied units. 
8.2 Biases 
It is hard to face the fact that we, humans, are not completely rational. This 
questions the notion about human behavior that have dominated and rooted itself 
in our culture for centuries. The good news however, is that we are sometimes 
rational and make pretty good judgments to guide our decisions. So where do we 
go wrong? 
One crucial feature of a rational agent is that it has preferences that are 
consistent with its behavior. If the rational agent diverges from its preferences it is 
because it lacks necessary information or the practical capacity to reach its 
preferred goals. A more humanlike creature, on the contrary, often makes the 
same mistakes as the rational agent, but also sometimes fails to align its behavior 
to its preferences. 
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The now established dual-process theory regards the human thinking in two 
different systems; the intuitive System 1 and the reflective System 2. System 1 is 
conducting most of our decisions and can never be turned off. System 2 sets in 
when we face more complex tasks or computations and is often bothered by the 
intervening emotions and intuitive arguments of System 1. It is in System 1 and in 
the fight between the systems that we find many of the cognitive biases. 
Researchers studying cognitive biases have found hundreds of different biases that 
make humans chose inferior actions. Since this paper is focused on the practical 
use of the bias-related insights, the number of biases included has been narrowed 
down. The relevant presented biases needed to explain the work and justifications 
conducted in the three cases are:  
 
• The status quo bias – people are systematically overvaluing passive 
alternatives, which are disproportionately common compared to 
alternatives that require action.  
• Scarcity and tunneling – when facing scarcity of money, time or social 
life, people are getting increasingly effective on managing that scarcity. 
However, at the same time other parts of life are being tunneled out.  
• Framing and loss aversion – The same alternative pitched in different 
ways gets chosen disproportionality, especially if one alternative is pitched 
as a loss.  
• Social conformity – we use fellow citizens to inform ourselves, we are also 
sensitive to peer pressure. This applies even if it leads us to unreasonable 
actions.  
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 The how-question 
The dominant approach to adapt to cognitive biases is, by far, the use of soft 
paternalistic nudges. Especially in the EU case there are however interventions 
with elements of a more coercive nature. The coercive elements have not been 
used on civic behavior, but to regulate private market actors. There is also a 
general believe among the cases that combinations of soft and coercive paternalist 
interventions might often be a smart strategy. Altogether the following findings 
answer the how-question of this paper: 
 
• The status quo bias is widely appealed to; mainly by the use of delicately 
designed default options, but also by the use of active-choice procedures. 
Default options (or rules) tend to be used for complex cases where 
individuals might have diverse preferences and would have needed 
expertise knowledge to make an optimal choice. Active choice procedures 
tend to be used for simpler choices where individuals easily can gain 
understanding of the overall picture. Active choice however, requires 
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choice architects to have a snag on the targeted citizen since there can be 
no passive or default choice. 
 
• Strategic simplification is another common strategy, especially in the UK 
and US cases. Citizens are facing thousands of minor decisions each day, 
all of which are taxing their mental capacity to some extent. Simplification 
can help individuals in general to make better choices, but seems to be 
especially effective when targeting underprivileged citizens. If trapped in 
scarcity traps their mental capacity can get heavily taxed and risks falling 
into a slippery slope where one biased decision makes yet another inferior 
decision more likely. 
 
• A third group of bias-related interventions used in practice is smart 
disclosure. Smart disclosure is designed by: appealing to System 1 with 
summary disclosures; regarding the framing and loss aversion biases and 
in some cases the social conformity biases. Another part of smart 
disclosure can be to mind the tunneling bias and carefully select the timing 
of a planned intervention. 
 
It is also noteworthy that governments tend to use insights drawn from cognitive 
biases in two main ways: 
 
1) To engage citizens in policy programs and gain attention for certain issues.  
2) To use protective interventions that prevent other actors, often traders, 
from exploiting biased decisions by citizens. 
8.3.2 The why-question 
The justifications for the use of behaviorally informed policy tools were 
investigated to answer the why-question of this paper. The behavioral 
applications studied in the three cases differ a bit in their roles, work and 
justifications. 
In the UK case the Behavioral Insights Team have acted as an internal 
taskforce with its base in the Cabinet Office. Cooperating with other authorities 
the team has used Randomized Controlled Trials on everything from paracetamol 
poisoning to tax obedience. The justifications for the use of soft paternalistic 
interventions are: 
 
• A time of fiscal constraints calls for new approaches in policymaking 
• New relevant research with strong potential 
• New innovative ways to change behavior in areas that have previously 
proved to be hard to change 
• A cheap but potentially powerful way to change civic behavior to the 
better 
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• Soft paternalistic ways such as nudging is a “low pain way” to change 
civic behavior 
• Soft paternalistic interventions require less justification than coercive 
interventions 
 
In the US case the federal Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
has acted as a bureaucrat gatekeeper with distinct elements of behaviorally 
informed strategies. OIRA’s work drawn from cognitive biases is mainly 
theoretical and the unit does not have capacity to conduct trials to lead their policy 
work like in the UK case. OIRA does however have the potential to induce 
agencies and authorities to act in certain ways and follow certain procedures. 
Through its position in the executive office of the President, OIRA also has the 
potential to influence the Presidents agenda. The justifications for the use of 
behaviorally informed nudges are: 
 
• Often more efficient than direct (coercive) regulation 
• Low cost way to change behavior  
• Low pain way to change behavior, by maintaining freedom of choice  
 
In the EU case the European Commission (EC) have worked with behaviorally 
informed tools mainly in the area of consumer behavior and consumer protection. 
EC are also arranging reoccurring conferences on the subject and there are explicit 
ambitions to extend the use of behaviorally informed policy to other policy areas. 
Because of the thematic use of behavioral insights so far, the justifications rest on 
grounds that differ a bit from the other cases. What justifies the use is that: 
 
• An increased diversity of products and services make the number of 
choices each individual has to make overwhelming 
• The time in which a purchase can be made is today down to seconds  
• The importance of enabling consumers/citizens to feel confident, 
empowered and to have a fair chance within the competitive 
environment in which they make their choices.  
 
The behavioral insights, drawn from cognitive biases, and its in-practice adoption 
into policymaking needs to be examined further. Most of the impacts from 
behaviorally informed interventions cannot yet be evaluated due to its recent 
implementation. The results of such evaluations will, together with continuing 
discussions on the philosophical aspects of paternalism, constitute a vindication 
for future use of behaviorally informed policy-tools.  
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